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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE ASSOCIATION OF  
SPENDING RATE AND SPENDING RATE VOLATILITY ON BORROWING COST 
 
Anna W. Hickey 
 
 Achieving minimum borrowing cost for municipal bonds is an ongoing concern.  
Apostolou, Apostolou, and Dorminey (2014) demonstrated that a fund accounting measure, 
spending rate magnitude (i.e., the absolute value of general fund revenues minus general fund 
expenditures) proxied for management’s ability to balance revenues and expenditures.  Their 
findings indicated that achieving balance at spending rate equilibrium (i.e., where general fund 
revenues equal general fund expenditures) was associated with minimum borrowing cost, and 
that the magnitude of departure from spending rate equilibrium was associated with higher 
borrowing cost.  Little is known regarding the information content of spending rate in the years 
during and after the financial crisis that started in 2007.  Given the crash of the housing bubble 
and severe reductions to property tax revenues, municipalities experienced a prolonged recovery 
that was characterized by a change to borrowing patterns and deficit spending.  In this study, I 
extended from Apostolou et al. (2014) and examined whether the information content of 
spending rate was conditional to levels of economic activity.  I accomplished this by using state 
leading indexes compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank to proxy for local economic activity.  
Based on a sample of 1,970 general obligations bonds that were issued by U. S. counties between 
1995 through 2014, I tested three conditional hypotheses for significant interaction between 
economic activity and spending rate magnitude.  Results indicated that the association between 
spending rate magnitude and borrowing cost was positively moderated by economic activity.  
Positive moderation was also significant for spending rate surpluses (i.e., where general fund 
revenues exceed general fund expenditures).  These results suggest that departures from 
spending rate equilibrium are more severely assessed on borrowing cost when economic activity 
is positive, and less severely assessed on borrowing cost when economic activity is negative.  
Overall, my findings provide preliminary evidence that managerial competence over the balance 
of revenues and expenditures is evaluated more severely when economic conditions are good - 
not when they are bad.   
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ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE ASSOCIATION OF 
SPENDING RATE AND SPENDING RATE VOLATILITY ON BORROWING COST 
 
1. Introduction 
In a public statement on the state of the U. S. municipal bond market, SEC Commissioner 
Luis Aguilar stated, “There is perhaps no other market that so profoundly influences the quality 
of our daily lives” (2015).  The municipal bond market has served as a critical source of 
financing for local governments to build and to maintain infrastructure.  Since the 1980s, the 
municipal bond market has experienced significant growth from an estimated $361 billion in 
outstanding debt to $3.7 trillion by 2012 (Securities Exchange Commission, 2012).  As of late 
2016, the Federal Reserve reported the total debt outstanding among state and local governments 
to be approximately $3.1 trillion.1   
Relative to the size of the U. S. bond market ($39.0 trillion) and the U. S. stock market 
($26.3 trillion), the size of the municipal bond market might appear small (Barr, 2015).  
However, when compared to the level of federal investment on infrastructure, the importance of 
the municipal bond market is essential to maintaining and improving the quality of life for U. S. 
citizens (Istrate, 2013).  Between 2003 and 2012, investment on infrastructure by states and local 
governments with borrowings from the municipal bond market was 2.5 times greater than federal 
investment (Istrate, 2013).2  Furthermore, the low default and tax-exempt benefits of the 
municipal market have made it an attractive and relatively secure option for long-term investors.  
As of 2013, approximately 75 percent of municipal bond holders consisted of American 
                                                          
1 Found in Table D.3. of the Federal Reserve Statistical Release for the third quarter, Financial Accounts 
of the United States, dated 08 December 2016.  
2 Compiled under the National Association of Counties (NACO).  NACO combined statistics from 
Thomson Reuters, the U. S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the U. S. Congressional 
Research Service (CRS). 
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households that were investing in their local communities while diversifying retirement 
portfolios (Istrate, 2013).  Thus, the viability of the municipal bond market has had important 
implications for household investors.   
The viability of the municipal bond market also depends on the cost of borrowing.  For 
municipalities, keeping borrowing cost at a minimum is important, as current year resources 
expended for interest payments could otherwise be used for other priorities.  On average, 
municipalities issue approximately $0.5 trillion annually in new bond issuances, incurring 
significant borrowing cost in the process (Ang & Green, 2011).  Although borrowing cost is to 
be expected, there remains concern among the SEC that municipalities pay too much due to 
inefficiencies in the market (Ang & Green, 2011; Aguilar, 2015).  One source of inefficiency is 
in the issuance process itself.  Municipal issuers have relied on myriad networks of underwriters 
and financial intermediaries just to access and/or to sell in the primary market (Istrate, 2013; Liu, 
2015).  On average, municipalities incur approximately eighty-nine basis points in direct 
underwriter fees and another twenty-eight basis points when underwriters resell bonds to 
investors in the secondary market (Ang & Green, 2011).  Taken together, municipalities have 
participated in a market that bears extranneous borrowing cost.  Thus, keeping borrowing cost at 
a minimum is one way to maintain its viability as a critical source of financing for 
municipalities. 
The financial crisis that began in late 2007 and the subsequent Great Recession of 2008 
changed the landscape of the municipal bond market.3  One major change was greater regulatory 
oversight from the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which carried several new requirements.  For 
                                                          
3 The Great Recession of 2008 partially overlapped with the financial crisis and recovery periods.  
Hereafter, for the sake of consistency, I refer to just the financial crisis and recovery periods throughout 
the paper. 
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example, municipal bond financial advisors are now required to register with the Municipal 
Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) (Liu, 2015).  Borrowing patterns among municipalities 
also changed.  As of 2014, new bond issuances in this market hit their lowest since 1991 (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2016b).  This dramatic change in borrowing patterns was unlike that of other 
economic downturns.  Furthermore, despite the Federal Reserve Board’s maintenance of low 
interest rates from 2010 to 2014, the volume of new bond issuances continued to decline (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2016b).  This is not to say, however, that municipalities were not borrowing.  
Pew Charitable Trusts (2016b) reported consistent and high refinancing of municipal bonds 
during the recovery period.  Furthermore, the SEC was concerned about a growing trend in 
municipal borrowing via direct loans instead of via new bond issuances (Aguilar, 2015).   
The financial crisis also increased the risk associated with the municipal bond market, 
(PwC, 2014).  Greater risk was largely driven by the reduction in tax-based revenues, which are 
essential to the municipality’s ability to pay its obligations (PwC, 2014).  Reduction in key 
revenues was largely attributed to declines in property values and property tax revenue, and state 
aid to local governments (Gross, Huh, Sylvester, & Zahradnik, 2012).  Combined, these revenue 
sources accounted for more than half of the revenue among local governments (Gross et al., 
2012; Atwell, Fehr, Huh, & Russell, 2013).  Furthermore, these effects were prolonged into the 
recovery period for municipalities due to the lag in property value assessments and tax 
collections.  Pew Charitable Trusts (2016a) reported wide variation in financial recovery after the 
financial crisis among 30 of the largest metropolitan cities.  As of fiscal year 2013, 16 major 
cities still experienced record declines in property tax revenues and 21 experienced further 
declines in state and federal aid (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016a). 
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Given the presence of greater risk from the financial crisis and the unstable and slower 
recovery, stakeholders in the bond markets may have relied more on accounting information to 
make decisions.  Givoly, Hayn, and Katz (2017) provided evidence that the information content 
of earnings in the corporate bond market has greater relevance during times of economic 
downturn.  Their finding suggested that economic activity, as proxied by the U. S. gross 
domestic product (GDP), is significant to the information content of corporate earnings and its 
association to various measures that are priced by the market (e.g., borrowing cost, bond returns, 
and yield spreads).  
In the municipal setting, spending rate (SR) is a measure of short-term financial 
performance of a municipality’s chief operating fund, called the “general fund” (Reck & Wilson, 
2014).4  Plummer, Hutchinson, and Patton (2007) defined SR as a “modified-accrual earnings 
measure…that resembles changes to working capital accruals.”  At fiscal-year end, SR indicates 
whether the governmental reporting entity is in a current-year surplus (revenues > expenditures), 
a current-year deficit (revenues < expenditures), or a balanced condition (revenues = 
expenditures) (e.g., Apostolou, Giroux, & Welker, 1985; Plummer et al., 2007).  Importantly, 
extant literature has identified SR as a signal to the market regarding the quality of fiscal 
management over revenues and expenditures in the current year, relative to an adopted budget 
(e.g., Apostolou, 1982; Pridgen & Wilder, 2013; Apostolou, Apostolou, & Dorminey, 2014).  
True interest cost (TIC) is the preferred measure of borrowing cost arising from the 
issuance of municipal debt (Simonsen & Robbins, 2002).  TIC captures the time value of money 
and is dynamic to changes in the interest rates in the market (Simonsen & Robbins, 2002; 
                                                          
4 Statement No. 34 of the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) outlines the financial 
reporting model for state and local governments.  The general fund is considered a major fund and is 
common to all municipalities that report per GASB Statement No. 34.  An overview of the governmental 
financial reporting model and additional information on SR is provided in Appendix C. 
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Plummer et al., 2007; Reck & Wilson, 2014).  Governmental accounting studies that have 
examined the association between SR and borrowing cost in the 1980 to 1990 timeframe 
primarily used net interest cost (NIC).  While other alternative measures have been explored, 
TIC is currently the most appropriate, timely, and comprehensive measure of borrowing cost.  In 
practice, the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) recommends TIC as a “best 
practice” measure of borrowing cost (1994). 
In a recent study by Apostolou et al. (2014), the authors reconciled mixed results from 
previous governmental accounting studies on the association between SR and borrowing cost 
(TIC).  Apostolou et al. (2014) found a positive association between borrowing cost (TIC) and 
the absolute value of SR (i.e., SR magnitude).  Their study was based on a sample of newly 
issued general obligation bonds over a thirteen-year period, from 1995 to 2007.  The authors 
described a positive association between SR magnitude and TIC as being nonlinear, 
nonmonotonic, and asymmetric around the SR equilibrium point (i.e., SR = 0, where general 
fund revenues equal general fund expenditures).  In other words, incremental deviations in either 
direction of SR equilibrium are assimilated by the market and priced as higher borrowing cost.  
The purpose of this study was to examine whether economic activity had differential 
effects on SR and its association to borrowing cost, as measured by TIC.  Givoly et al. (2017) 
identified economic activity as a key variable to the information content of earnings information 
in the corporate bond market.  I extended on this finding in the municipal setting.  If the 
information content of SR in the municipal bond market is assessed similarly to that of earnings 
in the corporate bond market, then TIC should be priced differently given different levels of 
economic activity.  While the extant literature has established an association between SR and 
 6 
 
TIC, the extant literature does not directly address the potential for a dependency in the 
association of SR and TIC on economic activity.   
To address this research gap, I used a modified extension of Apostolou et al.’s (2014) 
empirical models to examine the association between SR magnitude and TIC, conditioned on 
different levels of economic activity.  The sample consisted of 1,970 newly issued general 
obligation bonds issued by U.S. counties across a twenty-year period, from 1995 through 2014.  
To proxy for variations in economic activity, I used the state leading indexes reported by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  The state leading indexes provide a composite measure 
of local economic inputs (Puenpatom & Stark, 2016).  A series of OLS regressions were 
employed to test three hypotheses.  For the first hypothesis, I tested whether the SR-TIC 
association was moderated by economic activity.  Evidence from the corporate bond literature 
suggested that earnings information is more relevant during economic downturns.  Accordingly, 
I expected a significant interaction between SR magnitude and the state leading index, given that 
nearly half of the observations in the sample were from periods of extreme economic instability. 
Apostolou et al. (2014) found asymmetry in the associations between TIC and the 
magnitudes of SR surpluses and SR deficits, respectively.  Accordingly, for the second and third 
hypotheses, I separately tested the SR-TIC association for both deficits and surpluses, 
conditioned on levels of economy activity.  Lastly, I posed two research questions to explore 
whether the SR-TIC association was significant when SR was transformed to its second moment 
as a near-term, historic volatility measure.  Dichev and Tang (2008) explained that earnings 
volatility captures economic shocks, but that earnings volatility also provides greater information 
content to predict future earnings.  The information content of SR volatility has not been 
explored in the governmental accounting context.  From a research standpoint, studying a 
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characteristic of SR, within the context of the financial crisis, may provide incremental 
knowledge on the pricing of TIC in the municipal bond market during periods of economic 
turmoil.     
I make two contributions in this study.  First, I provide an expanded examination of SR 
and its association to TIC across twenty years (1995-2014).  This period included the years 
leading up to the financial crisis that started in 2007, and the subsequent years following this 
event.   Arnold (2009) provided a self-critique of accounting research surrounding the financial 
crisis of 2007.  She offered that the body of accounting knowledge failed to anticipate the 
financial crisis and encouraged research that addresses theoretical links between the 
macroeconomic environment and micro-accounting.  Given the changing landscape of the 
municipal bond market after the financial crisis, this study answers the call by examining the 
relative importance of governmental accounting information in pricing new municipal bond 
issuances across alternative economic environments.  Second, I ascertain whether Apostolou et 
al.’s (2014) findings hold during periods of extreme financial turbulance.  The authors developed 
empirical models that well-proxied for the prevailing interest environment using yield curve 
attributes.  Thus, testing their models with observations from the financial crisis and recovery 
years provides additional validation on the extendibility of their findings.   
This remainder of this study is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 covers the relevant 
literature.  Chapter 3 covers the sample, hypothesis development, variable definitions, and model 
specifications.  Chapter 4 summarizes the results.  Chapter 5 discusses the findings, limitations, 
and conclusions of the study.   
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2. Review of the literature 
This literature review consists of four sections.  The first section consists of select 
literature that provided evidence of market efficiency in the corporate bond market via earnings 
information.  Six studies were selected; four studies highlighted the conditions in which earnings 
information is associated to bond investor reactions and two studies provided evidence that 
earnings is a key variable in lowering a firm’s cost of debt.  While cost of debt broadly refers to 
the rate that a firm pays for all its borrowings, I only focused on the cost of debt related to 
corporate bonds.   
In the second section, I drew a parallel between corporate earnings and SR, based on 
Plummer et al.’s (2007) description of SR as a measure of modified-accruals earnings.  In doing 
so, I focused on a narrow stream of governmental accounting literature that began with Wallace 
(1981).  The governmental accounting literature provides consistent evidence that SR has 
information content and is associated to the borrowing cost of municipal bonds.   
To lay the groundwork for studying SR volatility, the third section features a combination 
of public finance and corporate literature that illustrate greater explanatory power in earnings 
volatility and a general motivation among managers to maintain smoothness in both earnings and 
SR.  Importantly, the fourth section contextualizes the recent financial crisis and the after-effects.  
Within this section, the role of accounting information surrounding the financial crisis and the 
economic consequences faced by municipalities are provided as foundational background for my 
study.   
2.1. Information content of earnings in the corporate bond market  
Extant literature provided evidence that bondholders and shareholders both seek 
accounting information regarding firm performance.  But the informational needs between 
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bondholders and shareholders differ fundamentally.  With respect to earnings information, the 
bondholders are more concerned in the firm’s income-generating ability to make promised 
principal and interest payments (Kothari, Ramanna, & Skinner, 2010).  Considering this, 
bondholders are inclined to place greater relevance on the downside risk from negative earnings 
(i.e., losses), which may signal the possibility of weak future cash flows (Plummer & Tse, 1999; 
Givoly et al., 2017).  Conversely, equity holders are more inclined to view the same earnings 
information with consideration of potential growth opportunities and the ability of earnings to 
convey future profitability (Givoly et al., 2017).   
Another fundamental difference between bondholders and shareholders is inherent to the 
nonlinear payoff structure of bonds.  In general, the bondholder’s interest payments and payoff is 
fixed (Easton, Monahan, & Vasvari, 2009).  As such, the relevance of positive or negative 
earnings information diminishes beyond a certain level for bond holders (Easton et al., 2009; 
Givoly et al., 2017).  Several studies in the corporate finance and accounting literature provided 
evidence that earnings are relevant to reactions in the U. S. corporate debt market.  The literature 
captured the relevance of earnings information in two ways: (1) the association between earnings 
information to bond investor reactions, as quantified by bond returns, bond trading activity, 
and/or bond-price changes, and (2) the association between earnings and a firm’s cost of debt. 
Plummer and Tse (1999) tested for differences in the association between earnings 
changes versus bond returns and stock returns, respectively, while controlling for the financial 
strength of the firm.  Financial strength was proxied by the firm’s bond rating and a reported loss 
or profit in earnings.  Importantly, the authors found that the financial strength of the firm was an 
important variable, particularly when earnings information conveyed bad news (i.e., a loss).  
Based on the liquidation option hypothesis, the authors predicted that as bond ratings decreased 
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(i.e., greater presence of default risk), the relationship between stock-returns and earnings would 
decrease, while the relationship between bond-returns and earnings would increase.  The authors 
used a sample of corporate bond observations (n = 4,983) from 1986 through 1993.  The sample 
was partitioned by reported losses and gains, and by bond rating levels.  Within each subsample, 
the authors estimated cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and cumulative bond returns (CBR) as 
a function of changes to earnings per share (EPS).  The model for CBR also controlled for 
macroeconomic movements with the inclusion of the U. S. Treasury bond index.  Results were 
consistent with the liquidation option hypothesis; specifically, the bond returns-earnings 
relationship was stronger than the stock returns-earnings relationship, for the firms in poor 
financial condition (i.e., losses and low bond ratings).  This finding highlighted the importance of 
downside risk in earnings and the importance of controlling for the firm’s financial condition.  
Additionally, the authors also found that investment-grade bonds were highly correlated with 
economic trends, as proxied by the U. S. Treasury bond index, but that below-investment grade 
bonds were not significantly correlated.   
In a related study, Easton et al. (2009) found that the association between unexpected 
earnings and bond trading activity was stronger when earnings conveyed bad news.  Easton et al. 
(2009) used the nonlinear payoff structure of bonds to make two hypotheses regarding the role of 
earnings in the corporate debt market: (1) that the relevance of earnings information would 
depend on whether earnings conveys good news or bad news, and (2) that given the bondholder’s 
diminishing sensitivity to the level of earnings losses or gains, the relevance of earnings 
information would further depend on the level of default risk.  Based on a sample of corporate 
bond issues from 1994 through 2006 (n = 10,237), the authors examined bond trading prices 
within a 61-day event window of bond earnings announcements.  Consistent with Plummer and 
 11 
 
Tse (1999), two major findings surfaced from their analysis.  First, the association of bond 
investor reaction to earnings information was greatest when earnings conveyed bad news; this is 
evidenced through increased bond trading activity and bond-price reactions within the event 
window.  Second, the relevance of earnings information was strongest amongst the higher-risk 
bonds in the sample, suggesting that the relevance of earnings information was associated not 
only with whether earnings conveys good news or bad news, but also with the risk of default.  
Importantly, Easton et al.’s (2009) findings implied that managers may have a disincentive to 
report bad news to the market before seeking capital from the corporate bond market.   
Defond and Zhang (2014) found that earnings information is also relevant to the 
timeliness of reactions in the corporate debt market.  The authors analyzed whether bond market 
reaction, quantified by cumulative abnormal bond returns, adjusted to quarterly earnings releases 
during three event windows: pre-announcement period (-20, -1), announcement period (-1, +1), 
and post-announcement period (+2, +20).  Parallel comparisons to stock market reactions were 
also conducted via cumulative abnormal stock returns.  The analysis of timeliness in bond versus 
stock reactions was conducted by partitioning the sample (n = 11,641 quarterly earnings 
announcements and 47,522 bond-year observations from 1996 through 2006) by good versus bad 
news, for each of the three event windows.  Main results indicated that bond reactions were 
significant and symmetric (between good and bad news) within the earnings announcement 
window (-1, +1).  However, within the other event windows, the relation between bond returns 
and earnings became asymmetric, whereby there was greater significance associated with bad 
news.  This asymmetry was most pronounced in the pre-announcement period.  In other words, 
the “…majority of bond reaction to bad news occurs before the earnings announcement date” 
(Defond and Zhang, 2014, 924).  Furthermore, when compared to stock market reactions, the 
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authors found opposite and asymmetric associations.  Specifically, stock market reactions 
became stronger in their association with good news in the pre-announcement and announcement 
periods.  Unlike bond reactions, most of the stock market reactions occurred within the 3-day 
announcement period (-1, +1).  Supplementary analysis also revealed that these findings were 
most pronounced among the speculative-grade bonds in the sample.  In sum, the evidence was 
consistent with prior literature that suggested earnings losses were more relevant to bondholders.  
Moreover, DeFond and Zhang (2014) extended the literature with evidence that suggested an 
overreaction by bondholders in anticipation of bad news. 
Givoly et al. (2017) studied whether the information content of accounting numbers in 
the corporate bond market versus the equity market changed over a 39-year period, from 1975 
through 2013.  The authors predicted that accounting information should have increased in its 
relevance over time in the corporate bond market, due to a greater focus on balance sheet effects 
(i.e., fair-value accounting) and a growing trend towards accounting conservatism.  Both factors 
positively contributed to a greater reliance on financial statements for creditors.  To test their 
prediction, Givoly et al. (2017) used a large sample of corporate bonds (n = 13,910 bond series 
issued by 2,754 firms) to assess the association between various accounting numbers and bond 
(equity) returns and bond (equity) valuations, respectively.  The authors found strong evidence 
that the information content of accounting numbers, as measured by adjusted R-squared values, 
increased over time in the corporate bond market.  In comparison, the association between equity 
returns and valuations declined over the sample period.   The authors also regressed information 
content on various economic and reporting factors.  Results revealed that information content 
was significantly and negatively associated to the state of the economy (i.e. GDP), suggesting 
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that accounting numbers have greater information content for corporate bondholders during 
periods of financial distress.   
Corporate literature also demonstrated that earnings information is associated to the 
firm’s cost of debt.  Jiang (2008) tested whether beating earnings benchmarks was related to 
reductions in the cost of debt.  Assuming stakeholders applied benchmarks as heuristics for 
evaluating firm performance, Jiang (2008) hypothesized that beating these benchmarks should 
lessen the information-processing costs for stakeholders and thus, lower the firm’s cost of debt.  
Based on prospect theory, Jiang (2008) predicted that people would be more sensitive to 
potential losses than gains, relative to a point of reference.  Accordingly, Jiang rationalized that 
managers have an incentive to beat earnings benchmarks in order to avoid negative opinions 
among external stakeholders.  Two samples were used that proxied for cost of debt (the credit 
ratings for n = 8,878 for firms from 1985-2002, and the initial yield spread for n = 1,798 newly-
issued corporate, nonconvertible, fixed-rate bonds from 1983-2002).  Three benchmarks were 
established based on earnings per share (EPS): beating zero earnings, beating last year’s 
earnings, and beating the most recent analyst’s forecasted earnings.  Three hypotheses were 
tested.  Results for H1 indicated that beating any of the benchmarks was associated with a higher 
probability of a credit ratings upgrade and smaller yield spreads.  This suggested lower cost of 
debt for firms.  Results for H2 showed that high-default-risk firms benefitted more in reducing 
the cost of debt when beating the zero-earnings and previous year’s earnings benchmarks.  
Results for H3 showed that beating the zero-earnings benchmark had a greater impact on the cost 
of debt, as compared to the other benchmarks. 
Bharath, Sunder, and Sunder (2008) viewed borrowing cost (i.e., cost of debt) as a 
function of the information risk associated with the quality of accounting information and its 
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ability to estimate future cash flows.  Specifically, Bharath et al. (2008) compared the quality of 
accounting information associated with corporate bonds (public debt) and bank loans (private 
debt).  The authors also studied the impact of accounting-information quality on the borrower’s 
choice in pursuing public versus private debt.  Using principal components analysis, a composite 
measure of accounting quality was developed from three different estimations of abnormal 
accruals.5  These estimations collectively proxied for the mismatch between earnings and 
operating cash flows and the influence of discretionary accounting choices (Bharath et al., 2008, 
2).  Based on a sample of firms that had both corporate bond and bank loans (n = 3,681 bonds 
and n = 12,676 loans from 1988 through 2003), Bharath et al. (2008) found that higher 
accounting quality was associated with lower cost of debt, as measured by smaller interest rate 
spreads.  Furthermore, the authors found that the probability of pursuing corporate bonds 
increased as accounting quality increased, and that bank loans had significantly higher interest 
costs than corporate bonds.  The authors also found that firms in higher risk of default obtained 
more bank loans than corporate bonds (significant at the 0.010 level).   Taken together, these 
findings suggest that the quality of earnings and cash flow information is associated with both 
the cost of debt, and a firm’s propensity to pursue private or public debt.    
2.2. Information content of spending rate (SR) in the municipal bond market  
The corporate bond literature provided ample and supporting evidence of market 
responses to earnings information (e.g., bond returns, trading activity, levels of default risk, 
changes in timing, and cost of debt).  Analogous to corporate earnings, the revenue and 
expenditure accounting information represented by SR provides a measure of financial operating 
performance for a municipality.  A narrow stream of governmental accounting literature provides 
                                                          
5 Abnormal accruals were estimated using variations of the modified-Jones model.  
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evidence that SR has information content to responses in the municipal bond market.  The 
governmental accounting literature has focused largely on market responses related to default 
risk and/or the cost of debt that the issuer incurred (i.e., the borrowing cost of municipal bonds).  
Measures commonly used to capture market responses have been net interest cost, variations of 
yield spreads, bond ratings, and true interest cost.  Seven studies were selected and are discussed, 
starting with Wallace (1981).  Wallace’s (1981) investigation on the information content of 
municipal accounting numbers was a catalyst for much of the literature presented in this section.  
Wallace (1981) studied whether variations in bond ratings and borrowing cost (net 
interest cost, or NIC) were associated with accounting and auditing variables that were perceived 
important by municipal market participants.  The sample consisted of general obligation (GO) 
bonds and revenue utility bond issues from the State of Florida for years 1974 to 1976.  Wallace 
conducted OLS and probit regressions on the full sample (n = 106 issues) and on a subsample (n 
= 73 city issues).  OLS regression for the full sample yielded no significance in auditing and 
accounting variables until Wallace removed bond ratings from the regression, which yielded a 
significant association between NIC and accounting variables.  OLS regression for the 
subsample resulted in significance for both auditing and accounting variables.  Importantly, SR 
was found to be positively associated with NIC, which implied that a deficit in the general fund 
could be positively associated with lower borrowing cost.  Wallace rationalized that the modified 
accrual basis for fund accounting warranted earlier recognition of expenditures and thus, an SR 
deficit could be perceived as a positive signal to the market that municipal managers did not 
distort the accounting information (p. 510). 
Ingram and Copeland (1982) studied non-callable GO bonds (n = 122) that were sold in 
the secondary market in 1977.  The authors hypothesized that municipalities under more rigorous 
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reporting requirements would exhibit lower systematic risk, smaller yield premiums, and smaller 
changes in yield premium.  The authors conducted a series of stepwise regressions with three 
different dependent variables: yield premium, change in yield premium, and the systematic risk 
of each municipality.6  Independent variables consisted of 28 accounting financial ratios, bond 
ratings, economic measures, and quality measures for audit, accounting, and financial 
management reporting practices required by the state.  SR for this study was measured as a 
change in SR across two periods.  The quality of reporting practices was captured with ordinal 
measures to proxy for the degree of relative strength of each state requirement.  Results showed 
that the presence of accounting regulations by the state was significant to reducing systematic 
risk.   
Wilson and Howard (1984) replicated and extended on Wallace’s work with a larger 
sample (n = 230) and methodological improvements.  Their sample consisted of only GO bond 
issues in the primary market from municipalities across the U.S. from 1978 through 1981.  Like 
Wallace (1981), Wilson and Howard used the same dependent variables of bond ratings and 
NIC.  Primary independent variables were selected based on a combination of quality accounting 
and auditing measures from governmental accounting literature and reported accounting 
practices.  Probit analysis was used to estimate bond ratings and OLS regression was used to 
estimate NIC.  Overall, the authors found greater association of accounting and auditing 
information with NIC and bond ratings.  As it related to SR, Wilson and Howard found that 
                                                          
6 To determine systematic risk, the authors estimated β (beta).  The model specification resembles the 
capital asset pricing model, in which the pricing of an asset is a function of a risk-free rate and the 
expected market return, and the coefficient for the expected market return is beta.  In this case, Ingram 
and Copeland (1982) estimated the average change in yield premium for each municipality, as a function 
of a risk-free rate and the monthly bond market portfolio; the coefficient for the monthly market portfolio 
is the systematic risk or beta that was used as a dependent variable.   
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higher SR balances (both surplus and deficit) were negatively associated to NIC.  Like Wallace 
(1981), this latter finding seemed counterintuitive for a deficit balance. 
Apostolou et al. (1985) reconciled prior mixed results in a study of GO serial bonds (n = 
478) that were issued by Minnesota municipalities in 1977 through 1980.  For this study, a single 
dependent variable (NIC) was tested in three OLS regressions: a reduced base model, a linear SR 
model, a nonlinear SR model.  Primary independent variables consisted of SR, information from 
a regional market index, and the average maturity of a serial bond.  The authors employed a 
nonlinear regression model that used a binary variable to isolate the difference between a 
negative SR slope and a positive SR slope.  The results provided initial evidence that the rate of 
surplus and deficit spending is positively associated to NIC.  Accordingly, Apostolou et al. 
(1985) were the first authors to suggest a relation between SR and NIC as nonmonotonic around 
a balanced-budget point.  In sum, given a government’s goal to maintain a balanced budget, a 
divergence from a balanced condition signals suboptimal oversight of the adopted budget and 
thus, net interest cost (NIC) increases with any departure from a balance in revenues and 
expenditures. 
Apostolou et al. (2014) addressed mixed findings from previous studies and revised an a 
priori expectation of a linear relationship between spending rate and borrowing cost. The authors 
applied several methodological improvements on a sample of GO bonds (n = 3,285), issued by 
314 counties among 36 states. The sample period for their study spanned thirteen years, from 
1995 to 2007.  The authors defined SR equilibrium as the point where SR equals zero, which 
proxied for managerial competence.7 Any deviations from SR equilibrium, in either a surplus or 
                                                          
7 For this study, Apostolou et al. (2014) transform SR from a ratio of revenues over expenditures (where 
revenues/expenditures =, > or < 1), to the magnitude of the difference between revenues minus 
expenditures (where revenues - expenditures = 0, + or -).  Thus, SR magnitude equal to zero has the same 
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deficit direction, were represented by SR magnitude (the absolute value of general fund revenues 
minus general fund expenditures).  Larger SR magnitudes implied a lesser ability by 
management to maintain a balance between actual revenues and expenditures.  The authors 
hypothesized a positive association between SR magnitude and TIC.   
Foundational to their investigation were empirical models that estimated TIC as a 
function of SR magnitude with control variables that proxied for the yield curve.  Yield curve 
attributes were captured by three measures: the average maturity of the bond issue in years, the 
natural log of the same, and the federal funds rate.  The federal funds rate is the interest rate 
established among lending institutions that maintain deposits at Federal Reserve banks.8  In lieu 
of the conventional Bond Buyer Index, Apostolou et al. (2014, 15) use the federal funds rate as a 
“direct observation of…underlying rates from which bonds are actually priced.”  In doing so, the 
authors introduced a proxy for the prevailing interest rate, based on a monetary policy.  Results 
indicated that the federal funds rate was statistically significant and positively associated with 
TIC.  The authors concluded that the association between SR magnitude and TIC is positively 
associated and follows a non-monotonic, nonlinear, and asymmetric profile: 
(1) The non-monotonic aspect of the model occurred at the equilibrium point (SR=0), 
where the sign of the slope of the association changed.  As SR magnitude increased, 
in either direction of a surplus or deficit, the slope of the association between 
spending rate and borrowing cost was positive (i.e., higher TIC). 
                                                          
meaning as SR equal to 1 for a balanced condition, as previously defined by Apostolou, Giroux, and 
Welker (1985).   
8 A lower federal funds rate would indicate expansionary monetary policy and lower interest rates.  A 
higher federal funds rate would translate to higher interest levels and in this context, higher borrowing 
cost for municipalities. 
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(2) The nonlinear aspect of the model explained that the increase in borrowing cost was 
not uniform as the departure from SR equilibrium increased.  Instead, a nonlinear 
function that resembled a total utility curve captured the diminishing marginal effects 
of interest rate properties in a yield curve under a normal economy.  In sum, as SR 
magnitude increased in either the surplus or deficit directions, the nonlinearity of SR 
indicated that its positive association with TIC marginally diminished. 
(3) Depending on whether there is an SR surplus or deficit, the association between SR 
and TIC was found to be asymmetric.  The authors conjectured that a negative 
departure from equilibrium (i.e. a deficit) was conveyed to the market more quickly 
and induced a higher borrowing cost than a positive departure (i.e., a surplus). 
(4) One control variable, unassigned fund balance scaled by county population, indicated 
a statistically significant and negative relationship with TIC.   
Two recent studies, Plummer et al. (2007) and Reck and Wilson (2014), addressed 
whether accrual-based accounting information provided incremental information over modified-
accrual accounting information, per the GASB Statement No. 34 financial reporting model.  
Importantly, both studies found significance of SR in assessing default risk.   
Plummer et al. (2007) focused on three measures (net assets, revenues minus 
expenditures, and current liabilities) from both levels of the governmental financial reporting 
model (i.e., accruals measures were from government-wide financial statements and modified-
accruals measures were from governmental funds statements).  The authors studied a sample of 
Texas school districts (n = 530) for fiscal year 2002 and estimated default risk as a function of 
the financial statement variables from both levels of financial reporting.  Default risk was 
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captured by transforming each school district’s underlying bond rating to a rank from 1 to 14.9  
As it pertained to revenues minus expenditures for the general fund, Plummer et al. (2007) found 
that the accruals earnings measure was not superior to the modified accrual earnings measure 
(i.e. SR is superior) when assessing default risk.  Furthermore, the authors found that credit 
ratings were less favorable for both deficits and surpluses; this finding is consistent with 
Apostolou et al. (1985) and Apostolou et al. (2014), who found that the municipal bond market 
assimilated greater risk for deviations in either direction of SR equilibrium.  Plummer et al. 
(2007) concluded that the best combination of measures for assessing default risk was with SR 
and the accruals measure for total net assets.   
Similarly, Reck and Wilson (2014) tested for the incremental informativeness of 
government-wide accounting information that is reported per GASB Statement No. 34.  The 
authors used a combination of NIC and TIC observations as their dependent variable.  Their 
sample consisted of GO bonds (n = 185) issued by municipalities in the 2002 through 2006.  The 
main empirical model estimated borrowing cost as a function of bond issue attributes, market 
factors, fiscal and socioeconomic factors.  Consistent with Plummer et al. (2007), the authors 
showed that SR and unassigned fund balance (both modified-accruals based) and long-term 
government-wide measures (accruals-based) were incrementally informative to explaining 
borrowing cost.  Specifically, the results suggest that the municipal bond market relies primarily 
on SR and the general fund’s fund balance to assess borrowing cost (p. 54).  However, unlike 
Plummer et al. (2007) the authors found a negative relationship between SR surpluses and 
borrowing cost.   
 
                                                          
9 Plummer et al. (2007) acknowledged that the ideal measure of default risk was with a continuous 
variable (e.g., bond yields). However, data constraints warranted the use of bond ratings instead.  
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2.3. Information content of historic volatility in earnings and spending rate (SR) 
One time-series property of earnings is its volatility.  In general, volatility is a measure of 
variability over time (Taylor, 2005).  Volatility can be interpreted and measured in different 
ways (e.g., historic volatility, implied volatility, stochastic volatility) (Taylor, 2005).  Of interest 
in this study is the historical volatility of SR, which is broadly described as the historical 
standard deviation of previously reported earnings (Taylor, 2005).10   
In this section, earnings volatility is defined from the perspective of Dichev and Tang 
(2008 & 2009).  As a part of this discussion, I briefly revisited Givoly et al. (2017) to highlight 
the relevance of earnings volatility in the corporate bond market.  Next, I examined whether 
earnings volatilty matters to market participants with respect to managing risk.  If risk levels 
change in the presence of volatility information, then it’s possible that there is incremental 
information content in earnings volatility, relative to the level-measure of earnings.  Two studies, 
Graham et al. (2005) and Erickson et al. (2016), were selected from the corporate literature to 
provide evidence that volatility matters to market participants.  Combined, these studies provided 
evidence that earnings volatility is significant to explaining variations in perceived risk among 
managers and investors.  Transitioning to the municipal setting, Felix (2015) provided evidence 
that municipal managers, like corporate managers, have motivation to maintain smoothness in 
earnings (i.e., to keep SR near zero for the general fund).  Lastly, Gore (2009) provided evidence 
that revenue volatility, a major component of SR, may potentially have adverse implications in 
the municipal setting.  
Dichev and Tang (2009, 161) explained that earnings volatility can be attributed to two 
factors: (1) volatility from economic shocks and (2) volatility from difficulties at the firm level in 
                                                          
10 This historical characteristic of earnings is consistent with the definition in the recent accounting 
literature (e.g., Dichev & Tang, 2008 and 2009; Givoly et al., 2017; Erickson et al., 2017). 
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determining income.  Using accounting information from U. S. firms over 40 years (n = 1,000 
firms from 1967 through 2003), Dichev and Tang (2008) presented a theory that mathematically 
relates the two previous factors to reported earnings.  Essentially, when there is perfect matching 
between revenues and expenditures (i.e., all the costs of the firm’s operations are perfectly 
matched to its associated revenues), then earnings volatility is entirely driven by economic 
factors related to the firm’s business environment (Dichev & Tang, 2008, 1428).  Further, 
Dichev and Tang (2008, 1428) showed that “…the volatility of earnings is increasing in the 
volatility of economic shocks and in the persistence of these shocks over time”.   
Consequently, any mismatching between revenues and expenditures will increase the 
volatility of earnings (i.e., introduce “noise” to the economic representation of earnings).  Results 
also revealed that the trend of mismatch in revenues and expenditures over time has increased 
over the 40-year period and has led to greater volatility in earnings (Dichev & Tang, 2008).11  
Consistent with Dichev and Tang (2008), Givoly et al. (2017) also found that earnings volatility 
was significantly and positively associated to their proxy for information content.  Givoly et al.’s 
(2017) results further indicated that the information content of earnings volatility steadily 
increased in its association to bond returns and valuations across the 39-year period.   
Erickson, Hewitt, and Maines (2017) found differential reactions between smooth versus 
volatile earnings among investors.  In an experiment, the authors tested for variations in 
investors’ risk judgements when evaluating earnings volatility, relative to the volatility of cash 
flows.  Based on attribution theory, the authors predicted investors would attribute opportunistic 
reporting to environmental factors first, rather than blame managers for possible malintent.  
Using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, the authors manipulated earnings (volatile vs. smooth) 
                                                          
11 Dichev and Tang (2008) also explained that poor matching will decrease the persistence of earnings 
and bring about more negative autocorrelation in earnings changes (p. 1456).   
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and operating cash flow (volatile vs. smooth).  The sample of participants consisted of business-
school alumni from a large university (n = 121 alumni, 6.7% response rate).  Participants were 
given four years of financial data and asked to provide investment risk judgments based on a 13-
point scale.  The findings revealed that investors perceived a higher level of risk when both 
earnings and operating cash flow were volatile.12 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) surveyed CFOs among public and private 
companies (n = 401 in the year 2003, 10.4% response rate) on reporting decisions related to 
earnings.  Across most of the sample, the authors found that CFOs placed tremendous weight on 
earnings information (relative to cash flows).  Moreover, most of the CFOs (78%) preferred to 
avoid reporting volatile earnings because they believed that volatile earnings were riskier for 
investors and stakeholders (p. 5, 66).  In one-on-one interviews among a subsample of CFOs (n 
= 20), the authors asked clarifying questions and found additional supporting evidence that 
meeting or exceeding earnings benchmarks could reduce the cost of debt for bond covenants.  
The authors found that this concern was most pronounced among CFOs from private firms and 
highly-leveraged and unprofitable public firms (p. 28-29).   
There is limited evidence that municipal managers, like corporate managers, also avoid 
volatility in earnings.  In the municipal setting, the optimal “earnings” benchmark is at SR 
equilibrium, or when revenues equal expenditures in the general fund (Apostolou et al., 1985; 
Apostolou et al., 2014).  Municipal managers have an incentive to maintain SR at or near zero, 
despite a prior surplus or deficit (Felix, 2015).  Large surpluses (SR>0) can signal excessive 
                                                          
12 Erickson et al. (2017) also conducted a second experiment that tested whether investors would give 
managers the “benefit of the doubt” when earnings are smooth versus volatile.  The authors found support 
that investors also had different perceptions of risk when managers were afforded different levels of 
reporting discretion (high versus low) and incentive (high versus low) when determining the accruals for 
each period.  Results show that investors’ risks heighten when they have additional information 
(incremental to earnings and cash flow volatility) to support earnings management. 
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collection of tax revenue or insufficient spending of expenditures for public services (Felix, 
2015).  On the other hand, large deficits (SR<0) might signal poor management of public 
resources and/or an inability to adhere to balanced budget rules (Felix, 2015; Costello et al., 
2017).  Based on a hand-collected sample of municipalities (n = 103) from 2001 through 2003, 
Felix (2015) found that municipal managers used inter-fund transfers to maintain SR near zero 
across the sample period.  Furthermore, this practice was most pronounced when municipal 
managers were subject to greater oversight and credit monitoring.   
There is scant literature related to the information content of SR volatility in the 
municipal bond market.  However, Gore (2009) provided initial evidence that the revenue 
component of SR can carry adverse implications if there is extreme revenue volatility.  Gore 
(2009) found that revenue volatility was positively correlated with the presence of state level 
revenue (i.e., intergovernmental funds)13, growth, changes in total taxes, and administrative 
spending.  Similar to estimations of historical earnings, Gore estimated revenue volatility using a 
coefficient of variation, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of revenue to the mean 
revenue over the sample period across four years.  Using a sample of U. S. municipalities (n = 
9,413 from 1997 through 2002), Gore (2009) found that revenue volatility was positively and 
significantly associated with high levels of cash and that these higher cash levels were 
significantly associated with agency problems.  Gore proxied for agency problems by testing the 
association between excess cash levels and increases to city manager salaries, bonuses, and 
administrative spending.  Whether volatility in revenues manifested into SR volatility is 
                                                          
13 As an aside, Trussel and Patrick (2013) found that the most important predictor of impending fiscal 
distress in municipalities, as measured by a reduction in public services, is a high level of dependence on 
intergovernmental revenues, relative to total revenues. 
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unknown.  However, her study provided preliminary evidence that revenue volatility, in the 
extreme, was not consistent with signs of good fiscal stewardship among municipal managers.  
2.4. The financial crisis of 2007 and the impacts on the municipal bond market 
The shift in accounting standards to fair value practices was a major contributing factor to 
the U. S. financial crisis that started in late 2007 (Kothari & Lester, 2012).  Under a prosperous 
economy that began in 2001, the shift to fair value accounting practices permitted the recognition 
of inflated gains on securitized assets among lending institutions.  In turn, these gains were 
repackaged and sold as new loans.  Concurrently, the prevalence of poor lending practices, 
particularly by lenders in the sub-prime mortgage market, facilitated higher-risk home purchases 
(Kothari & Lester, 2012, 347).  Many of the mortgages were debt contracts that were constructed 
with adjustable interest rates.  When the Federal Reserve Board started to raise interest rates in 
2005, the default on mortgages drastically increased as homeowners struggled to support higher 
mortgage payments (Kothari & Lester, 2012, 347).  The widespread defaults in the sub-prime 
mortgage market eventually led to the failure and/or collapse of large lending institutions (e.g., 
Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and Lehman Brothers).  The relatively fast decline in the U. S. 
financial sector also resulted in massive unemployment across the country as companies initiated 
large-scale employee layoffs (Kothari & Lester, 2012, 347).   
Municipalities were also severely affected by the financial crisis.  Numerous defaults on 
mortgages and the decline in real estate prices left local governments with a “one-two punch,” as 
property tax revenues and state aid declined (Gross et al., 2012).  Combined, these two revenue 
sources accounted for more than half of local revenues (Gross et al., 2012).  On the expenditures 
side, municipal managers were simultaneously faced with greater demands for public services 
stemming from the lagged effects of population growth during periods of economic prosperity, 
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prior to the financial crisis (Atwell et al., 2013; McDonald III, 2015).  Unlike the private sector, 
the recovery period following the crisis was particularly difficult for local governments.  Gross et 
al. (2012) reported that in past recessions, property taxes, on average, remained steady given that 
real estate prices were not drastically affected.  The recent financial crisis, however, uniquely 
affected the housing market on a large scale, which significantly reduced property tax 
revenues.14  Coupled with the fact that property tax reassessments have a lagged effect on the 
collection of tax revenues, the effects of the financial crisis extended further into the recovery 
period for municipalities (Gross et al., 2012; Atwell et al., 2013).  
Most municipalities addressed impending fiscal distress through a combination of raising 
taxes, cutting spending, dipping into fund balance reserves to close out year-end deficits, and 
short-term borrowing via short-term municipal bonds (Gross et al., 2012; Atwell et al., 2013).  A 
significant motivator for states to intervene over municipal finances was the potential for a 
downgrade to credit ratings at the state level due to the possibility of “contagion” effect, whereby 
credit downgrades across multiple municipalities could also damage the state’s credit ratings 
(Atwell et al., 2013, 15).  
Literature on the impact of the financial crisis on the municipal bond market is sparse.  
Park, Matkin, and Marlowe (2017) studied the association between internal control deficiencies 
and municipal bond borrowing cost.  The authors used TIC as their dependent variable and 
estimated TIC as a function of internal control deficiencies, market conditions, and issue 
characteristics.  Results showed that higher borrowing cost for municipal bonds was associated 
with the most severe internal control deficiencies (i.e., material weaknesses).  Their study was 
based on a sample of newly issued municipal bond issues (n = 3,633), for the period 2005 
                                                          
14 As an example, Gross et al. (2012) reported that home prices in Arizona fell nearly 50 percent from 
2007 to 2011. 
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through 2012, for California, Texas, and Washington.  The authors made an additional prediction 
that the internal control-TIC association would be more salient during the financial crisis and the 
subsequent period of recovery.  The authors used binary variables to code the years of the 
financial crisis (2008 for financial crisis; 2009-2010 for recovery) and then tested for 
significance in the interaction terms between each economic period and material weakness 
indicators.  The interaction terms were not statistically significant for bonds issued in the 
financial crisis period.   
2.5. Summary 
The corporate literature provided evidence that earnings has information content that is 
associated with various market responses (e.g., bond returns, trading activity).  Common among 
the corporate literature was the sensitivity of bondholders to downside risk in earnings.  In a 
recent study, Givoly et al. (2017) found that the information content of earnings in the corporate 
bond market has steadily increased in its relevance and that this upward trend can be largely 
attributed to the shift to fair value accounting practices and accounting conservatism; both of 
which contribute to a greater reliance by creditors to accounting information.  Importantly, 
Givoly et al. (2017) also found significance that both economic (e.g., GDP) and reporting factors 
were significant to information content of earnings in the corporate bond market.  Most relevant 
to this study was the negative relationship of GDP to information content, suggesting that the 
information content of accounting information is more relevant during economic downturns.   
A modified-accruals measure of “earnings” in the municipal setting is the SR reported on 
general fund performance.  Analogous to the literature that supports the importance of earnings 
information to the corporate bond market, a narrow stream of governmental accounting literature 
supports the importance of SR to the municipal bond market.  Starting with Wallace (1981), 
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these governmental accounting studies consistently provided evidence that SR has information 
content to responses in the municipal bond market. 
The assessment of both earnings and/or SR information involved a benchmark.  Jiang 
(2008) demonstrated that the zero-earnings benchmark is the most salient benchmark and that 
beating this benchmark (i.e., reporting a profit) is significantly associated with lower cost of debt 
among firms participating in the corporate bond market.  In the governmental accounting 
literature, three studies (Apostolou et al., 1985; Plummer et al., 2007; Apostolou et al., 2014) 
suggested that “beating the benchmark” in the municipal setting was in maintaining the zero 
benchmark at SR equilibrium, where revenues equal expenditures.   
Among some of the governmental studies, measurement of SR varied given the inclusion 
of different deflators.  For example, Apostolou et al. (1985) used revenues divided by 
expenditures (i.e., revenues/expenditures).  Apostolou et al. (2014) used revenues less 
expenditures scaled by population (i.e., (revenues-expenditures)/population).  Plummer et al. 
(2007) and Reck and Wilson (2014) used revenues less expenditures scaled by revenues (i.e., 
(revenues-expenditures)/revenues).  Despite the differences in deflators, they all represented 
measures of general fund performance.  Importantly, the government accounting literature is 
consistent with the notion that better general fund performance is associated with lower relative 
risk, which is associated with lower borrowing cost.   
Dichev and Tang (2008) demonstrated that earnings volatility varied with the volatility of 
economic shocks.   Graham et al. (2005) and Felix (2015) showed that CFOs and municipal 
managers preferred smoothness in earnings and SR, respectively.  Erickson et al. (2016) 
provided evidence of differential risk levels in the presence of both earnings and cash flow 
volatility.  Gore (2009) provided related evidence that revenue volatility, in the extreme, may be 
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associated with agency problems in the municipal setting.  Givoly et al. (2017) also showed that 
the volatility of core net income is positive and significant to information content in the 
corporate bond market.  If SR is assessed by the municipal bond market as earnings is in the 
corporate bond market, then evaluating its volatility may also provide greater insight on its 
information content, particularly given the economic shock from the financial crisis that started 
in 2007. 
An overall assumption among all the studies is that the accounting information is based 
on GAAP financial statements.  Bharath et al. (2008) provided evidence that the quality of 
accounting information matters and that firms with lower accounting quality tended to seek 
financing from banks instead of through corporate bonds.  In the municipal setting, Park et al. 
(2017) also showed that accounting quality matters.  Specifically, material weaknesses in GAAP 
reporting were associated with higher municipal borrowing cost.  Interestingly, Park et al. (2017) 
found no significant difference in borrowing cost in the financial crisis and early recovery 
periods. 
Clear evidence exists that municipalities were adversely affected by the financial crisis 
and that these effects extended well into the recovery period (Gross et al., 2012; Atwell et al., 
2013).  Specifically, Atwell et al. (2013) reported higher incidences of credit downgrades, 
reduced levels of revenues, and higher incidences of municipal distress and financial crisis.  How 
these circumstances manifested to changes in relative risk assessments in the municipal bond 
market is yet to be fully understood, as only two studies (Givoly et al., 2017 and Park et al., 
2017) included samples that extended into the financial crisis and post-financial-crisis periods.  
Although Park et al. (2017) studied the municipal bond market, their study focused on only three 
U. S. states and their model did not include SR as a variable to estimate borrowing cost.  Givoly 
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et al.’s (2017) study provided foundational information on the importance of economic activity 
on information content in earnings; but their study was solely focused on the corporate bond 
market.  This leaves an obvious research gap for further inquiry into the information content of 
SR and the municipal bond market.  Table 1 in Appendix A provides a summary of the literature.  
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3. Research design 
This chapter presents the sample, hypotheses, variables, and empirical models for this 
study.  Development of three hypotheses and two research questions were based on a 
combination of corporate and governmental accounting literature.  Sample selection involved the 
use of four data sources to study a sample of GO bonds issued by U. S. counties.  Model 
specifications to estimate TIC were based on OLS models defined by Apostolou et al. (2014).  
Consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), statistical analyses incorporated the employment of a 
series of OLS regressions and the application of fixed effects for panel data. 
3.1. Hypothesis development 
3.1.1. The moderating effect of economic activity on SR and TIC 
Givoly et al. (2017) found that the information content of accounting numbers were 
negatively associated with economic factors, as proxied by GDP.  This finding suggested that 
accounting information was more relevant to bondholders as economic activity declined.  The 
governmental accounting literature provided evidence that the municipal bond market also 
evaluated accounting information and that SR was a key variable.  The financial crisis and 
recovery have changed the risks associated with municipal bonds, as evidenced through credit 
downgrades and more incidences of fiscal distress (Atwell et al., 2013; PwC, 2014).  These 
additional risks should be assimilated on TIC.  I extend from the findings of Givoly et al. (2017) 
and predict that in the municipal bond market, SR is more relevant to the pricing of TIC as 
economic activity declines.  This suggests that economic activity has a moderating effect on the 
SR-TIC relationship.  H1 is stated as follows: 
H1:  The association between spending rate magnitude and borrowing cost is moderated 
by economic activity. 
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Apostolou et al. (2014) provided strong evidence that the association between SR and 
TIC was asymmetric for surpluses and deficits.  In the corporate literature, DeFond and Zhang 
(2014) also found asymmetry in earnings losses and profits in the pre- and post- announcement 
periods.  Thus, to test potential asymmetries in SR deficits and SR surpluses, two additional 
hypotheses are established.   
Corporate literature consistently supported the sensitivity of market reactions to earnings 
losses in the bond market, largely due to the potential risk of default (Plummer & Tse, 1999; 
Jiang, 2008; Easton et al., 2009; Givoly et al., 2017).  A major consequence of the financial crisis 
was a decline in key revenue sources among municipalities, which resulted in greater deficit 
spending (Atwell et al., 2013).  If the municipal bond market assesses SR deficits similarly to 
earnings losses in the corporate debt market, then municipalities with SR deficits should be 
assessed as being in higher risk of default, which should further be associated with higher 
borrowing cost (i.e., TIC) in a poor economy.  Thus, I offer that the association between SR 
deficits and TIC should be more salient when economic activity is low.  H2 is stated as follows:  
H2:  Negative departures from SR equilibrium (SR deficits) are assessed more severely 
on TIC as economic activity declines. 
 
SR surpluses represent deviations from SR equilibrium in the positive direction.  SR 
surpluses were found to be positively associated with TIC (Apostolou et al., 1985; Plummer et 
al., 2007; Apostolou et al., 2014).  The corporate literature also suggested that given the 
nonlinear payoff function of bonds, the sensitivity of bondholders to greater levels of positive 
earnings (or surpluses) diminishes beyond a certain point.  However, results from Reck and 
Wilson (2014) showed that SR was negatively related to borrowing cost, suggesting that 
surpluses were associated with lower borrowing cost.  In short, the results were mixed as it 
pertained to SR surpluses and its association to borrowing cost for municipal bonds.   
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In periods with low economic activity (i.e., poor condition), I posit that SR surpluses are 
viewed more favorably than in periods with high economic activity.  Two reasons support this 
assertion.  The first reason is based on the idea of unexpected earnings.  Per the corporate 
literature, unexpected positive earnings were associated with lower cost of debt (Jiang, 2008; 
Bharath, 2008).  During the financial crisis, the general expectation among municipalities, given 
drastic reductions in key revenue sources and growing public expenditures was deficit spending 
during the fiscal year (Gross et al., 2012).  Consequently, municipalities had to use reserves to 
maintain SR equilibrium.  Atwell et al. (2013) discussed that during the financial crisis, 
municipalities dipped into their fund balance reserves more frequently to cover year-end deficits 
and that a declining fund balance was a warning signal of impending financial distress and/or 
crisis.  Thus, a municipality that could achieve SR surplus at fiscal year-end sent an unexpected 
and positive signal to the market during periods of poor economic condition.    
A second reason is inherent to the recalibration of municipal bond ratings that began in 
early 2010.  Moody’s new rating methodology quantitatively rewards SR surpluses with higher 
credit ratings (Praagh & Dorer, 2010).  Moody’s uses an SR equal to 1 (revenues/expenditures) 
to indicate balanced budget operations.  An SR equal to 1 is rated “A”  while an SR greater than 
1 (i.e. a surplus) receives an “A” or above.  Likewise, an SR less than 1 (deficit) receives a rating 
below “A.”  Taken together, I posit that during economic downturns, SR surpluses reduce the 
relative risk assessed by municipal market participants.  H3 is stated:  
H3:  Positive departures from SR equilibrium (SR surpluses) are assessed less severely 
on TIC as economic activity declines. 
 
3.1.2. The moderating effect of economic activity on SR volatility and TIC 
Corporate studies supported the notion that managers and investors avoid volatility in 
earnings because greater volatility is associated with greater risk (Graham et al., 2005; Erickson 
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et al., 2017).  Similar to the corporate sector’s preference for smoothness in earnings, I offer that 
municipal managers and investors in the municipal bond market also prefer smoothness in SR.  
This is also supported by Felix (2015), who provided evidence that municipal managers were 
motivated to maintain stability of SR at or near zero with interfund transfers.  If the municipal 
bond market perceives SR volatility as a signal of uncertainty in future cash flows, then they 
should perceive greater risk in SR and this risk should be assimilated on TIC.    
Dichev and Tang (2009, 161) explained that earnings volatility among firms can be 
attributed to large shocks in the economy.  The financial crisis created a shock to economic 
activity that adversely affected municipalities (Gross et al., 2012; Atwell et al., 2013).  If SR 
volatility, like earnings volatility, captures shocks in economic activity, then there should be 
greater SR volatility during the financial crisis and recovery periods.  Greater SR volatility 
should be associated with greater relative risk.  Thus, during these economic periods, accounting 
information on SR volatility should also have greater relevance to the municipal bond market.  
This suggests that the association between SR volatility and TIC is stronger during economic 
downturns.  In sum, SR volatility, like corporate earnings, may provide information content to 
the municipal bond market.  If so, then the information content of SR should also be moderated 
by economic activity.  Thus, I explore the information content of SR volatility by addressing two 
research questions:  
RQ1: Is TIC associated with SR volatility? 
 
RQ2: Is the association between TIC and SR volatility moderated by economic    
   activity?  
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3.2. Variables  
3.2.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is TIC.  TIC includes several underlying costs related to bond 
issuance (e.g., finance charges, discount points, possible late fees, prepaid interest, and the time 
value of money) (Simonsen & Robbins, 2002).  TIC is also a continuous variable that better 
captures the effects of accounting information on borrowing cost (Plummer et al., 2007; Reck 
and Wilson, 2014).  Reck and Wilson (2014) noted that TIC is superior to bond ratings, since 
bond ratings are adjusted at longer intervals.  In contrast, TIC captures the default risk in the 
market at the time of issuance.  The GFOA also identifies TIC as a “best practice” measure of 
borrowing cost (GFOA; Simonsen & Robbins, 2002). 
3.2.2. Independent variables 
Two independent variables are studied.  The first independent variable is spending rate 
magnitude (SR).  Consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), the magnitude of SR will be used for 
hypothesis testing (to be discussed later in section 3.3).  For RQ1, I adopt the approach used by 
Gore (2009) for revenue volatility to calculate SR volatility.  Specifically, SR volatility is 
calculated as the coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation of SR, scaled by the 
mean of SR, over the previous five years.   
The second independent variable, economic activity (ECON), is based on the state 
leading indexes that are produced by the Federal Bank of Philadelphia.  State leading indexes 
serve as a six-month outlook of local economic conditions.  The state leading indexes for each 
state are similar to the Leading Index for the U. S., which relies on multiple economic indicators 
to capture economic trends (Puenpatom & Stark, 2016).  The leading indexes provide a 
composite measure of national and local economic inputs (Puenpatom & Stark, 2016).  Higher 
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index scores indicate better economic conditions and vice versa.  Bagley et al. (2016, 4) 
explained that the Leading Index for the U. S. provided a “smoothing effect that avoids much of 
the volatility reflected in individual components.”  Similar to the Leading Index of the U. S., the 
state leading indexes are based on a coincident index for each state and are further adjusted with 
additional lead indicators that capture unique measures related to growth at the state level (e.g., 
housing permits, unemployment, manufacturing surveys by the Institute for Supply Management 
which monitors for changes to production).15  Puentpatom and Stark (2016) found that state 
leading indexes outperformed the national-level Leading Index for the U. S.  
3.2.3. Control variables 
Consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), control variables fall into four major categories:  
the unassigned fund balance, bond characteristics, bond issuer characteristics, and yield curve 
attributes.   Governmental accounting literature has provided evidence that a municipality’s 
unassigned fund balance is significant to borrowing cost (e.g., Plummer et al., 2007; Apostolou 
et al., 2014; Reck & Wilson, 2014).  Unassigned fund balance represents the portion of total 
assets less total liabilities that is not subject to spending constraints.  The unassigned fund 
balance is directly increased or decreased, based on SR deficits or SR surpluses for each 
accounting period.  Consistent with prior research, I expect a negative association between 
unassigned fund balance and TIC.  
Bond characteristics and issuer characteristics (e.g., maturity, issue amount, bond rating) 
are frequently included in estimations of borrowing cost.  For this study, I use the same variables 
                                                          
15 The coincident index is published monthly by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  The 
coincident index consists of four indicators: nonfarm payroll employment, average hours worked in 
manufacturing, the unemployment rate, and wage salary disbursements deflated by the average CPI for 
the municipality.  Estimation of each of these factors follows Stock & Watson (1989).  See 
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/regional-economy/indexes/coincident. 
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specified by Apostolou et al. (2014).  Proxies for the yield curve include alternative measures of 
the federal funds rate (LEVEL).  The federal funds rate is the interest rate that is established 
among lending institutions that maintain deposits at Federal Reserve banks.  The federal funds 
rate provides a direct and non-biased estimation of interest rate levels in the municipal bond 
market (Apostolou et al., 2014).  A higher federal funds rate indicates higher cost for borrowing 
in the overall market.  Importantly, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) conclude that the federal funds 
rate provides comparatively better information content for the movement of real macroeconomic 
variables at the national level.  Specifically, the federal funds rate does not suffer from the same 
level of endogeneity with contemporaneous economic conditions, as do other measures of 
interest rate levels (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992).  To account for the effects of quantitative 
easing by the Federal Reserve Board, I estimate TIC with a combination of the federal funds rate 
and the “shadow” federal funds rate that were provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
and estimated with models developed by Wu & Xia (2016).  Variable descriptions are 
summarized in Table 2. 
[insert Table 2 here] 
 
3.3. Empirical model and specifications 
I extend from the OLS model specified by Apostolou et al. (2014), which estimated TIC 
as a function of SR, bond and issuer characteristics, and yield curve attributes. 16  Exact model 
                                                          
16 A partial replication of Apostolou et al. (2014) was conducted to determine the extendibility of the 
authors’ findings for the financial crisis and recovery years (2007-2014).  Overall, replication results 
showed that their findings are largely replicable for linear estimations of SR, and that these findings are 
extendible into longer time horizons (i.e., 1995-2014).  Accordingly, all hypothesis tests for this study 
were based only on linear estimations of SR.  While the nonlinear properties of SR may be worthy of 
further exploration, inclusion of nonlinear estimates for this study was not essential for the stated research 
objectives.  Based on replication results, I also deviated from Apostolou et al. (2014) and used a stronger 
transformation for the CURVE control variable, computed as the inverse of years to maturity. 
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specifications for hypothesis tests and research questions are discussed in the next sections.  The 
OLS regressions for this study follow the general form: 
Borrowing cost = f (spending rate, economic activity, interaction terms, control variables) 
 Application of fixed effects is applied across model specifications for all hypothesis tests 
to correct for statistical dependence in repeated observations and to reduce the possibility of 
omitted variable bias.17  In their empirical models, Apostolou et al. (2014) restricted SR to 
capture the change in slope at SR equilibrium (i.e., nonmonotonicity).  Specifically, any 
departure from SR equilibrium was constrained so that the regression coefficient for SR was 
forced to take a positive or negative sign, regardless of whether SR was a deficit or surplus.  I 
maintained this restriction for H1, H2, and H3.  Tests for SR volatility (RQ1 and RQ2) requires 
the use of an unrestricted model to effectively compare SR (level) with SR volatility measures.  
Control variables remain the same throughout all testing. 
3.3.1. Specification for H1 
H1 tests whether economic activity moderates the SR-TIC association.  For this 
hypothesis, two variables are added to Apostolou et al.’s (2014) base model.  The first variable, 
ECON, captures variations in economic activity.  The second variable is an interaction term that 
captures the moderating effect of economic activity on the SR-TIC association.  I expect a 
statistically significant coefficient (i.e., a p-value < 0.050) for the interaction between SR 
magnitude and ECON.  The model for H1 is specified: 
                                                          
17 Consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), I apply fixed effects in OLS regress regressions.  Replication 
results were optimal when county-level fixed effects were removed and replaced with state-level fixed 
effects.  Based on the replication results, I rationalize that county-reported SR may not change 
considerably from one period to the next and thus, the application of county-level fixed effects might 
have been too restrictive and eliminated substantial variations in SR.  Thus, I re-specified Apostolou et 
al.’s (2014) models with state-level fixed effects; this approach eliminated within-entity variation among 
the individual entities while preserving variation in the SR measures that were reported by counties. 
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TICit = β0 + β1SR1it + β2ECONjt + β3SR1it×ECONjt + β4FBit + β5SLOPEit + β6CURVEit 
                + β7LEVELt + β8AMTit + β9BIDit + β10BRit + β11CALLit + β12FEj + εit (1) 
 
Independent variables 
SR1 = absolute value of total revenues less total expenditures, divided by population 
ECON  = the leading index for state(j) of county(i), in the same month of the bond issue 
SR1×ECON = interaction of SR1 and economic activity  
 
Control variables 
FB  = total unassigned fund balance divided by population 
SLOPE  = average maturity of the bond issue in years 
CURVE  = the inverse of the average maturity of the bond issue in years (i.e., 1/SLOPE) 
LEVEL  = the combination of the effective federal funds rate (1995-2008) and the  
        shadow federal funds rate (2009-2014), for the same month of the bond issue 
AMT  = natural log the maturity value of the bond issue scaled by population 
BID  = binary variable coded 1 if the bond was competitively bid; otherwise 0 
BR  = binary variable coded 1 if the bond rating is Aaa; otherwise 0 
CALL  = binary variable coded 1 if the bond is callable; otherwise 0 
FE  = estimated state fixed effects 
 
3.3.2. Specification for H2 and H3 
H2 and H3 are tested together.  Like H1, I introduce variables for SR deficits (SRD) and 
SR surpluses (SRS), and corresponding interaction terms (SRD×ECON and SRS×ECON).   H2 
and H3 each predict different moderating effects of economic activity on the SR-TIC 
relationship for deficits and surpluses, respectively.  For H2, I expect a positive coefficient for 
the interaction term, SRD×ECON (i.e., β4).  For H3, I expect a negative coefficient for the 
interaction term, SRS×ECON (i.e., β5).  Equation 2 is specified as follows: 
TICit = β0 + β1SRDit + β2SRSit + β3ECONjt + β4SRDit×ECONjt + β5SRSit×ECONjt 
                 + ∑β6-14 control variables + εit                (2) 
Independent variables 
SRD = absolute value of SR deficit (revenues < expenditures) divided by population 
SRS = absolute value of SR surplus (revenues > expenditures) divided by population 
ECON  = the leading index for state(j) of county(i), in the same month of the bond issue 
SRD×ECON = interaction of SRD and economic activity  
SRS×ECON = interaction of SRS and economic activity 
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3.3.3. Specification for RQ1 and RQ2 
RQ1 explores SR volatility (SRVOL) and its association to TIC.  To estimate SRVOL, I 
follow Gore (2009) and compute the coefficient of variation of SR as the ratio of the standard 
deviation of SR to the mean of SR, over the previous five years.   
To make comparisons between SR (level) and SR volatility, the model is estimated 
without any constraints (i.e., an unrestricted model).  For RQ1, I replace SR (level) with SR 
volatility (SRVOL).  Although I do not make a directional prediction, I expect a positive 
coefficient for SRVOL (i.e., β1).  For RQ2, I further include the interaction term 
(SRVOL×ECON) to test whether economic activity moderates the association between SRVOL 
and TIC.  I expect this association to be more severe during poor economic conditions (i.e., β3 in 
model 3b should be positive).  The models for RQ1 and RQ2 are specified in Equations 3a and 
3b, respectively:18 
TICit = β0 + β1SRVOLit-5 + β2ECONjt + ∑β3-11 control variables + εit  (3a) 
TICit = β0 + β1SRVOLit-5 + β2ECONjt + β3SRVOLit×ECONjt  
    + ∑β4-12 control variables + εit      (3b) 
Independent variables 
SRVOL = coefficent variation of SR over the previous five years 
ECON  = the leading index for state(j) of county(i), in the same month of the bond issue 
SRVOL×ECON = interaction of SR volatility and economic activity  
 
Table 3 summarizes the tests, variables, and expectations of the study. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
 
3.4. Data and sample selection  
The sample consisted of GO bond issues by U. S. counties from 1995 through 2014.  GO 
bonds issues are ideal for this study because they are backed by the “full faith and credit” of the 
                                                          
18 Clustering by counties is used in lieu of fixed effects. 
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municipality’s taxing power, rather than by a particular revenue stream (Apostolou et al., 2014; 
Seymour, 2014).  Relative to other types of municipal bonds, GO bonds also largely reflect 
market interest rates (Reck & Wilson, 2014).   
Four separate databases are used to create the sample.  Information on GO bond 
characteristics and related borrowing cost are from the Securities Data Company’s (SDC) 
Platinum Database maintained by Thomson Reuters Financial Services.  SDC Platinum is a 
comprehensive, online database that has facilitated a plethora of academic and practitioner-based 
financial research (e.g., SEC 2012; Apostolou et al., 2014).  The SDC Platinum database is also 
recommended by the American Accounting Association (AAA) as a reliable source for research 
data on new municipal bond issues.19  Reported accounting information for SR and general fund 
balances are from the financial indicators database maintained by the Government Finance 
Officers Association (GFOA).  The GFOA compiles accounting information from the audited 
annual financial reports (i.e., CAFRs) of governmental entities.  Prior research has shown that 
differences in the quality of financial reporting among local governments have significant effects 
on borrowing cost and bond ratings (Baber & Gore, 2008; Henke and Maher, 2016).  Thus, I 
control for heterogeneity in financial reporting quality by only using accounting information 
from CAFRs that are awarded the GFOA’s Certificate of Achievement for Excellence in 
Accountability Reporting (CAEAR).  Data for yield curve attributes consists of combining data 
from SDC platinum for bond maturity information and from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
for the federal funds rate.   
State leading indexes are gathered from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.  
McDonald III (2015) highlights that county governments are commonly considered the 
                                                          
19 http://aaahq.org/GNP/Research/GNP-Data-Sources 
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“administrative units of the state” and thus, are subject to state mandates on the provision of 
public services.  As compared to cities or towns, this distinctive function placed on county 
governments makes them relatively more dependent on intergovernmental revenues from the 
state and potentially more susceptible to changes in state economies (McDonald III, 2015).  
Given the focus on county GO bonds and county-reported SR, the use of state leading economic 
indexes is relevant. 
The sample selection is summarized in Table 4.  I extracted 17,001 observations from 
SDC Platinum that consisted of GO bond issues which were issued by primary county 
governments.  From this data, I eliminated 12,638 observations that did not have an observation 
for TIC.  Preparation of CAFR data required hand validation of general fund revenue and 
expenditure values among 34 county CAFRs.  No CAFR observations were eliminated from this 
process.   After merging GO bond data with CAFR data, the sample was reduced to 1,970 
observations. 
[insert Table 4 here] 
 
  Table 5 provides a closer look at the distribution of the sample by state.  Per Table 5, 
new GO bonds were issued by 294 counties among 36 states.  Six states (Maryland, Wisconsin, 
North Carolina, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas) account for approximately half (50.31%) of the 
sample.  Notably, a larger number of bonds were not necessarily issued by a larger number of 
counties.  For example, only two counties (Clark and Washoe counties in Nevada) account for 
3.96% (n = 78) of the full sample.  In contrast, 17 counties in California issued n = 46 bonds, 
which equates to approximately 2.7 bond issues per county (41 issues/17 counties) over the 
sample period for California. 
 [insert Table 5 here] 
 
 43 
 
Tables 6 and 7 provide sample distributions by year and economic time periods, 
respectively.  Per Table 6, the largest percentage (8.58%) of bond issues were issued in the year 
2010.  In contrast, the smallest number of bond issues were issued in the year 1995 (1.73%).   
Consistent with Pew (2016b), a noticeably fewer number of new GO bonds (n = 99) were issued 
in the year 2008, as compared to the follow-on recovery years.  In Table 7, determination of the 
relevant dates for the economic periods (pre-financial crisis, financial crisis, recovery) are in 
accordance with the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).20  The majority of the 
sample (55.7%) was from the pre-financial crisis period, followed by the recovery period 
(35.55%).  New GO bonds issued during the financial crisis period make up only 8.93% of the 
sample and are smaller in total size of $7.16 million, as compared to $39.6 million in the pre-
financial period and $26.5 million in the recovery period.    
[insert Table 6 and Table 7 here] 
 
  
                                                          
20 See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html. 
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4. Analysis 
 This section reports the summary statistics and the main results.  Two steps were 
necessary before hypothesis testing was conducted: (1) check of the appropriateness of the data 
against normality assumptions, and (2) validate the extendibility of Apostolou et al.’s (2014) 
findings into the financial crisis and recovery years via replication.  Results of a post hoc 
analysis related to RQ1 and RQ2 are also reported.  
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 8.  Over the sample period, the average TIC 
was 3.640% and ranged between 0.120% and 7.160%.  Average SR was $87.0 per capita.  The 
highest SR deficit level was -$425.0 per capita (King County, WA in 1997) and the highest SR 
surplus level was at $1,394.0 per capita (Fairfax County, VA in 2001).21  The sample largely 
consisted of observations with SR surpluses (80.3%, n = 1,581), as compared to SR deficits 
(19.7%, n = 389).  The average state leading index (ECON) was 0.978 and varied between  
-8.204 (Genesee County, MI in 2008) and 5.233 (Clark County, NV in 2003).  The average 
population was 551,296 with 97.3% (n = 1,916) of the sample representing counties that were 
classified as urban areas.22  The average level of reported unassigned fund balance (FB) was 
$86.0 per capita.  The years to maturity (SLOPE), a primary proxy for the yield curve, averaged 
15.6 years.  Other proxies for yield curve attributes (CURVE and LEVEL) averaged 0.120 and 
                                                          
21 SR surpluses in the 95% and above percentiles of the sample consist entirely of observations from three 
counties that surround the Washington D.C. metro area: Fairfax County and Loudon County in Virginia, 
and Montgomery County in Maryland.  Per the U. S. Census Bureau, these counties are among the 
wealthiest counties in the U.S. based on median household income 
(https://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/data/highlights/files/2015highlights.pdf).  
22 Counties with population of 50,000 or greater are considered urban areas 
(https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/urban-rural.html). 
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1.901, respectively.23  The total amount of bond issues (AMT) averaged $37.2 million.  Other 
variables for bond characteristics (BID, BR, CALL) consisted of bonds that were competitively 
bid (94.6%, n = 1,865), were rated “Aaa” per Moody’s (n = 1,707), and were callable (86.7%, n 
= 1,449), respectively.   
[insert Table 8 here] 
 Figure 1 shows the average trend of TIC, SR, and ECON across the sample period.  
Compared to TIC and ECON, SR was relatively stable and near zero across time.  Average TIC 
shows a steady decrease from 5.09% in 1995 to 2.75% in 2014.  As expected, average ECON 
dipped below zero during periods of recession that followed the crash of the “dotcom” bubble in 
2001 and the financial crisis in 2007.24  Figure 2 provides a closer examination of cross-sectional 
means for SR, SR surpluses (SRS), and SR deficits (SRD).  Across the years, a major drop in 
SRS average occurred in the year 2002 and then leveled out.  Interestingly, the highest average 
levels of SRD were associated with periods of growth in economic history versus periods of 
recession. 
[insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 Gross et. al. (2012) reported that municipalities dipped into fund balances to make up 
year-end deficits.  Figure 3 depicts the average trend of negative spending rates (i.e., SR deficits) 
versus the average trend of unassigned fund balance.  Across the sample period, FB showed a 
steady increase with spikes in fund balance levels in the years after the financial crisis.  In 
comparison, the overall trend of average deficits was steady and closer to a zero value across the 
sample period.   
                                                          
23 The CURVE variable was transformed to the inverse of years to maturity (i.e., 1/SLOPE).  Thus, an 
average value of 0.120 for the CURVE variable indicates that the interest rates across a range of shorter 
and longer maturities begins to vary at approximately 8.33 years. 
24 http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
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[insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Table 9 provides Pearson correlation values (r) for the variables used in regressions.  
Values with correlation coefficients that are significant at the 5% level (p < 0.050) and greater 
than the absolute value of 0.50 (i.e., |0.50|) are in bold.  TIC was positively correlated with SR at 
0.189 (p < 0.001).  TIC was also significantly correlated with SR magnitude (SR1) at 0.183 (p < 
0.001) and SRS at 0.189 (p < 0.001).  SRD did not show a significant correlation with TIC at 
conventional levels but was relevant at -0.038 (p < 0.100).  SR volatility (SRVOL) was 
positively correlated with TIC at 0.068 (p < 0.050).  The ECON variable was negatively 
correlated with TIC at -0.065 (p < 0.050).  The ECON variable was not significantly correlated 
with any of the level measures of SR (i.e., SR1, SRD, SRS), but was positively correlated with 
SRVOL at 0.068 (p < 0.050).  Unassigned fund balance (FB) was negatively correlated with TIC 
at -0.175 (p < 0.001).  The yield curve attributes of SLOPE, CURVE, and LEVEL all show 
significant correlations (p < 0.001) with TIC at values of 0.515, -0.340, and 0.672, respectively.  
Among the variables for bond characteristics, the call provision (CALL) was positively 
correlated with TIC at 0.419 (p < 0.001), which is consistent with literature that callable bonds 
have higher borrowing cost.  However, counter to literature was a positive and significant 
correlation between TIC and bond rating (BR) at 0.125 (p < 0.001). 
[insert Table 9 here] 
4.2. Assessment of normality assumptions 
Given significant correlation among some of the variables, a check for multicollinearity 
was conducted by evaluating variation inflation factors (VIF).  VIF scores near or above 10 
indicate problems with multicollinearity in the model (Field and Miles, 2010).  The highest VIF 
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among all the variables is 2.18 for SLOPE. 25  Overall, VIF analysis provides insufficient 
evidence that multicollinearity was a problem.   
Graphical examination of TIC, SR, and ECON indicated the presence of non-normality in 
the raw data.  The distribution of the dependent variable, TIC, appeared approximately 
symmetric with skewness equal to -0.554 and a kurtosis at 2.90, which was near the conventional 
standard of 3.0.  The SR distribution followed a leptokurtic profile that was positively skewed at 
3.35 with excess kurtosis at 13.31.  The ECON variable also followed a leptokurtic profile that 
was negatively skewed at -1.37 with excess kurtosis at 3.69.  To address non-normality in the 
raw data, hand validation of extreme outliers for TIC and SR was conducted to correct for 
skewness and kurtosis.26   
A joint skewness/kurtosis test (Jarque-Bera) for normality was also conducted on the 
residuals from regression models.  Results of the Jarque-Bera test (p < 0.001) were significant 
for the presence of non-normality in the residuals.27  However, graphical assessment of the 
residuals indicated a distribution that was closer to approximating a normal distribution for 
skewness at 0.40.  The kurtosis of the residuals, however, was still above conventional standards 
at 5.82, which is associated with lower power for hypothesis testing (Field and Miles, 2010).  In 
sum, I considered the sample to be adequate for testing under parametric approaches, given hand 
validation of the outliers in the sample and given significant results from the partial replication.  
                                                          
25 Reported VIF scores are those obtained prior to regressions with interaction terms, as the inclusion of 
products of SR (e.g., SRD×ECON) will introduce collinearity and thus, inflate VIF scores.  I also 
evaluated VIF scores with interaction terms included for all regressions.  The highest VIF was 4.13 for 
the SRD×ECON interaction and is below the cautionary value of 10.  
26 To preserve the sample size, a review of 34 CAFRs and verification of corresponding population 
figures against Census Bureau estimates to validate and/or to correct outliers.  Transformation of the data 
was also attempted but did not improve normality. 
27 Field and Miles (2010) recommend visual examination of distributions, along with quantitative testing 
of significance in nonnormality, for sample sizes greater than 200.  
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Specifically, significant results from the replication demonstrated that the sample size of n = 
1,970 provided sufficient power for hypothesis testing. 
Importantly, normality assumptions for the disturbance term were evaluated to assess 
whether errors in the data generating process were appropriate for hypothesis testing.  Results of 
the Breusch-Pagan test for equality in the variances of the error term did not provide sufficient 
evidence to reject the null of homoscedasticity (p = 0.857).  However, a general test for 
heteroskedasticity (White) in the error term was significant for heteroskedasticity (p < 0.001).  
Given the presence of heteroskedasticity, the application of robust standard errors in all 
regressions was used to relax the assumption of homogeneity in the error term.  Lastly, 
consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), the application of fixed effects was also applied to 
correct for statistical dependence among repeated observations by the same entities across the 
panel and to reduce the effects of unobserved, time-invariant variables.  Results of the Hausman 
test (p = 0.001) confirmed the use of fixed effects over random effects.   
4.3. Results 
 All models were estimated for the entire sample period (1995-2014).  For H1, H2, H3, 
state fixed effects were applied to all OLS regressions.   
4.3.1. Test of H1 
H1 tested whether economic activity at the state level moderated the association between 
SR magnitude (SR1) and TIC.  No directional prediction was made.  A statistically significant 
coefficient for the interaction term, SR1×ECON, provided evidence to reject the null that there is 
no moderating effect of economic activity (ECON) on the SR1-TIC association.   
Table 10 (column 1) presents regression results that were first estimated without the 
SR1×ECON interaction.  This initial estimation was necessary to validate that SR1 and ECON 
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were individually associated with TIC, prior to interaction.  Results of this first regression show 
that the overall model was significant (p < 0.001) with 71.7% of the within-variation explained.  
Consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), SR1 was positively associated with TIC with an 
estimated coefficient of 0.248 (p < 0.010).  ECON was estimated at -0.052 (p < 0.010) and 
indicated a direct main effect on TIC.   
H1 is supported.  Regression results are reported in Table 10 (column 2).  The overall 
model for H1 was significant (p < 0.001) with 71.8% of the within-variation explained.  
Regression results showed a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction 
term, SR1×ECON (0.155, p < 0.010).  The SR1 variable also became nonsignificant after 
interaction with ECON, which provides additional support that the association between SR and 
TIC depends on the level of economic activity.   
The significance of the interaction term suggests that state economic activity (ECON) 
moderates the SR1-TIC association with an additive effect that makes the SR-TIC association 
more or less positive, depending on the value of the state leading index.  Specifically, when 
economic condition is good (ECON > 0), the SR1-TIC association became more positive (i.e., 
higher borrowing cost).  Conversely, when economic condition was bad (ECON < 0), the SR1-
TIC association became less positive.  Taken together, economic condition positively moderates 
departures from SR equilibrium (i.e., SR1), such that TIC is more severely assessed when 
economic condition is good (ECON > 0), as compared to when economic condition is bad 
(ECON < 0). 28   
                                                          
28 Additional estimation of TIC using binary measures for ECON also confirmed a strong positive 
interaction between SR1 and ECON.  ECON was assigned a value of “1” if the state leading index was 
greater than zero, and “0” otherwise.   
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The results for H1 also indicate that the level of TIC is influenced by the main effect of 
ECON.  Regression results showed a negative association between ECON and TIC.  Specifically, 
when ECON is zero, indicating no growth or decline in economic activity, there is no interaction 
with SR and thus, there is no interaction between SR1 and ECON.  However, when economic 
condition is good (ECON > 0), a discount is imposed on TIC as a main effect.  Conversely, when 
economic condition is bad (ECON < 0), a premium is imposed on TIC as a main effect.  
 [insert Table 10 here] 
 
4.3.2. Tests of H2 and H3 
H2 and H3 were jointly tested.  Overall, these hypotheses tested for differential 
moderating effects when SR was bifurcated between SR surpluses (SRS) and SR deficits (SRD).  
The rationale for differential effects between SRS and SRD was based on the asymmetric 
associations between TIC and positive and negative SR, respectively (Apostolou et al., 2014); 
specifically, that SRD was assessed more severely on TIC.  H2 predicted that economic activity 
(ECON) would positively moderate the SR-TIC association such that borrowing cost (TIC) 
would be higher when there is a deficit (SRD).  A significant and positive coefficient for the 
SRD×ECON interaction term would support H2.  Conversely, H3 predicted that economic 
activity (ECON) would negatively moderate the SR-TIC association, such that borrowing cost 
(TIC) would be lower when there is a surplus (SRS).  A statistically significant and negative 
coefficient for the SRS×ECON interaction term would support H3. 
Table 11 (column 1) reports the results for H2 and H3 without interaction terms.  The 
same procedures for H1 were repeated for H2 and H3.  Results for this first regression (Table 11, 
column 1) included ECON and but no interaction terms.  Consistent with Apostolou et al. (2014), 
the coefficients for positive and negative SR magnitudes were both positively associated with 
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TIC but unequal in their effects on TIC.  Specifically, results for Table 11 (column 1) showed 
that SRD is 0.888 (p < 0.010) and the SRS coefficient was 0.247 (p < 0.010), which affirms an 
asymmetric association with TIC.  Results also indicated that the ECON variable, estimated at -
0.052 (p < 0.010), was negatively associated with TIC.   
H2 is not supported.  Although the overall model is significant (p < 0.001) with 71.9% of 
the variation explained, regression results in Table 11 (column 2) indicated that the interaction 
between SRD and ECON was nonsignificant.  The interaction term, SRD×ECON, was 
suggestive that SRD had a relevant association with TIC at the 10% significance level.  
However, there is insufficient evidence to reject the null for H2.    
H3 is not supported.  Regression results in Table 11 (column 2) showed a positive and 
significant coefficient for the interaction term, SRS×ECON (0.153, p < 0.010).  The positive 
sign of the coefficient was counter to the prediction for H3, which postured a negative 
moderation by ECON on the SR-TIC association, such that there would be a favorable effect of 
SR surpluses on borrowing cost (i.e., less penalty on TIC).  Similar to results in H1, SRS became 
nonsignificant once the interaction was introduced, providing evidence of a clear interaction 
between SRS and the ECON variable.  Consistent with results for H1, the positive moderation 
indicates that departures from SR equilibrium for surpluses (SRS) are assessed more severely on 
TIC when the economic condition is favorable. 
[insert Table 11 here] 
 
4.3.3. Effects of control variables 
 Consistent with prior literature, conditioning on unassigned fund balance (FB) indicated 
that FB was significant and negatively associated to TIC.  Results for H1 estimated a coefficient 
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of -0.872 (p < 0.100).  Similarly, results for H2 and H3 showed a coefficient estimate of -0.915 
(p < 0.010).   
Yield curve attributes across all models were significant.  Comparison of column 2 for 
Table 10 and Table 11 show that the SLOPE variable was 0.055 (p < 0.010), indicating that 
bonds with longer maturities were exposed to greater risk and thus, have higher borrowing cost.  
As expected, the CURVE variable was -0.544 (p < 0.050) for H1 and -0.541 (p < 0.050) for H2 
and H3.  The negative sign for the CURVE variable indicated that the positive relation between 
TIC and years to maturity diminishes.  Also, regressions for all hypotheses yielded a positive 
coefficient of 0.267 (p < 0.010) for the LEVEL variable, which proxied for the prevailing 
interest rate of the yield curve.   
 Bond rating (BR) was nonsignificant in all estimations.  This result may have been 
attributed to difficulty among rating agencies to properly capture default risk during periods of 
economic instability.  Other variables for bond characteristics showed that the amount of the 
bond issue (AMT) was negatively associated (-0.052, p < 0.010) with TIC.  This is consistent 
with past research, which has found that larger bond issues are associated with lower borrowing 
cost (e.g., Simonsen and Robbins, 2002; Park et al., 2017).  Also consistent with past research 
was the increase in borrowing cost given a call provision (Simonsen and Robbins, 2002).  The 
CALL variable across all models showed a positive estimate of 0.373 (p < 0.010) for H1 and 
0.374 (p < 0.010) for H2 and H3.  The BID variable, which describes whether the bond sale was 
competitively sold, was negatively associated with TIC at estimates of -0.152 (p < 0.100) for H1 
and -0.154 (p < 0.100) for H2 and H3.  However, the coefficient estimates for the BID variable 
did not reach conventional levels of significance. 
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4.3.4. Additional analysis 
Given significant results for H3, a simple slopes analysis was conducted to decompose 
the interaction between SRS and ECON.  To conduct this analysis, I evaluated how the slope of 
SRS on TIC changed when holding ECON constant at various levels.  SRS values were 
evaluated at the mean and the first, second, and third standard deviations of SR magnitudes for 
the sample.  The mean of SRS observations represented the closest value to SR equilibrium 
among SRS observations, while each increase in standard deviation represented a larger 
departure from the mean.  Slopes were computed for TIC on SRS, for each 0.5 increment of 
ECON, ranging from -8.0 (near the lowest value in the sample) to +5.5 (near the highest value in 
the sample).   
Table 12 reports the adjusted predictions for TIC on SR, for selected values of ECON 
between -2.0 through +2.0.  For each ECON value, the positive association between TIC and 
SRS magnitude was maintained.  Specifically, borrowing cost increased as SRS departed from 
the point that was closest to SR equilibrium (i.e., μ).  However, the overall level of TIC differed, 
depending on whether ECON was positive or negative.   
 [insert Table 12 here] 
4.4. Tests of RQ1 and RQ2 
  RQ1 and RQ2 explored whether SR volatility (SRVOL) was significant to estimating 
borrowing cost, and whether SRVOL was moderated by ECON, respectively.  Before conducting 
the test for RQ1, the cross-sectional means of SR and its corresponding determinants (i.e., 
general fund revenues and general fund expenditures) were evaluated to get an overview of 
average trends across the sample period.  Figure 4 shows that the average trend for SR was fairly 
stable relative to the average trend of its determinants.  Figure 4 also depicts a gradual increase in 
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the average trend of revenues and expenditures across the entire sample period, despite a 
relatively level profile for SR.  Gross et al. (2012) reported that municipalities experienced a 
sharp decline in tax revenues because of the financial crisis and that this reduction prolonged the 
recovery period.  Consistent with this report, Figure 4 shows a clear reduction in both the 
average trend of revenues and expenditures in the years following the financial crisis, starting in 
2009 and through 2012.  
[insert Figure 4 here] 
 Regression results for RQ1 are reported in Table 13.  SRVOL was computed as the 
coefficient of variation of SR for the previous five years, starting with the year 2002 and through 
2014.29  After computation of SRVOL, a sample size of n = 1,316 remained.  Table 13 (column 
1) provides the results of a preliminary regression that was estimated with SRVOL and without 
the ECON variable.  The overall model was significant (p < 0.001) with 71.0% of the variation 
explained.  The coefficient for SRVOL was estimated at 0.009 (p < 0.050) and was positively 
associated with TIC.  Although the coefficient for SRVOL showed significance at a conventional 
level, the value of the coefficient was indiscernible from zero.  Combined, there was weak 
evidence that SRVOL is relevant to borrowing cost.30  
[insert Table 13 here] 
 I also reestimated the previous regression and added the ECON variable.  Table 13 
(column 2) provides the estimates with both SRVOL and ECON included as test variables.  The 
overall model remained significant (p < 0.001) with 61.9% of the variation explained.  When the 
                                                          
29 To amplify, SRVOL for 2002 (SRVOL2002) was computed based on SR for years 1997 through 2002, 
SRVOL2003 was computed based on SR for years 1998 through 2003, and so on. 
30 Gore (2009) found significance in revenue volatility.  Accordingly, I separately tested whether the 
volatility of SR determinants (revenues and expenditures) were significant to explaining TIC. I did not 
find significance with either variable. 
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ECON variable was added, SRVOL fell out of significance and the coefficient value remained 
near zero.  The ECON variable was still negatively associated to TIC with a coefficient estimated 
at -0.075 (p < 0.010).  Per Table 9, ECON and SRVOL were negatively correlated at -0.056 (p < 
0.050).  Taken together, the combined effects of ECON and SRVOL on TIC were inconclusive.  
Given insignificant results for SRVOL, RQ2 was not testable.   
 Like the results for H1, H2, and H3, the control variables of FB and the yield curve 
attributes (SLOPE, CURVE, LEVEL) remained significant with signs in predicted directions.  
SLOPE showed a positive coefficient of 0.065 (p < 0.010) across both regressions.  CURVE 
showed a negative coefficient of -0.759 (p < 0.010, column 1) and -0.725 (p < 0.010, column 2). 
The amount of the bond issue (AMT) was estimated at -0.070 (p < 0.010, column 1) and -0.068 
(p < 0.010, column 2).  Both bond rating (BR) and the type of bond sale (BID) were 
nonsignificant in both regressions.    
4.5. Post hoc analysis for SR persistence 
 Given inconclusive results for SRVOL, I explored whether the inverse of SR volatility, 
its persistence, was relevant to the pricing of TIC.  Persistence is one of several proxies for 
earnings quality and is described as the sustainability of earnings (Dechow and Schrand, 2010).  
Hence, most corporate literature has been motivated by the assumption that a higher persistence 
in earnings is an indicator of better earnings quality (Dechow and Schrand, 2010).   
4.5.1. Theory and model specification for SR persistence 
 Dichev and Tang (2009) provided a mathematical relationship between earnings volatility 
and persistence.  Specifically, a persistence coefficient (γ2) can be estimated for the relative 
predictability of earnings by regressing current year earnings based on 1-year lagged earnings: 
 Earningst = α0 + γEarningst-1 + εt                 (4) 
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Taking the variance for both sides of the previous equation and rearranging terms yields a 
persistence coefficient (γ2) that is equal to the R-squared of the previous regression. 
 γ2  = 1 – Var(ε)/Var(Earnings)                 (5) 
Consistent with Dichev and Tang (2009), I assumed that the variance of earnings is stationary 
over time, given a one-year time horizon.  I substituted SR as an earnings measure to estimate 
the persistence coefficient.  An autoregressive regression of SR was estimated as a function of 
SR from the previous time period that did not exceed three years: 
 SRt = α0 + γSRt-3 + εt                   (6) 
The R-squared from the autoregressive regression yielded a persistence coefficient of γ2 = 0.439 
for the sample period.  A higher value for γ2 would indicate greater predictability of SR.  With an 
estimate for SR persistence for the subsample, I extended from Apostolou et al.’s (2014) model 
to estimate TIC on SR persistence.31     
 TICit = β0 + β1SRPERSISTit + β2ECONjt + β3FBit + β4SLOPEit + β5CURVEit + β6LEVELt   
      + β7AMTit + β8BIDit + β9BRit + β10CALLit + εit              (7) 
4.5.2. Subsample selection 
 To conduct an autoregressive regression for SR and to focus on years surrounding the 
financial crisis, I restricted the full sample to include observations from years 2005 through 
2011; this timeframe is +/- three years of the Great Recession of 2008.  Next, I kept only 
counties that issued GO bonds in the pre-financial, financial crisis, and recovery.  If there were 
multiple GO bonds sold in the same year, I chose the bond with the highest TIC.  This left me 
with a balanced sample of n=150 bonds issued by 50 counties in 17 states.  
 
                                                          
31 Clustered by counties. 
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4.5.3. Test for SR persistence (post hoc) 
 I made no prediction on the direction of the coefficient but expected that SRPERSIST 
would be negatively associated with TIC.  Table 14 (column 1) reports the regression results for 
the estimation of TIC on SRPERSIST.  All models were estimated with OLS with robust 
standard errors clustered on county.  I explored the significance of SRPERSIST without fixed 
effects.  Fixed effects can remove the effects of time-invariant influences, which may include the 
persistence of SR if it does not change much over time.  Instead, I clustered by county to control 
for correlation in the error term within each county.  The overall model was significant (p < 
0.001) with 49.6% of the variance explained.  The variable, SRPERSIST, was estimated at 2.252 
(p < 0.010).  This result was counterintuitive and suggests that borrowing cost increases as the 
relative predictability of SR increases.  Unlike previous regressions, the control variables of 
unassigned fund balance (FB), the federal funds rate (LEVEL), and the callable provision on 
bonds (CALL) fell out of significance when SRPERSIST was introduced to the model.  Yield 
curve attributes of SLOPE and CURVE were estimated at 0.056 (p < 0.010) and -2.371 (p < 
0.010), respectively. 
 Next, I added the ECON variable to evaluate whether it was significant to explaining TIC 
in the presence of SRPERSIST.  Regressions results are shown in Table 14 (column 2).  As 
expected, ECON was negatively associated with TIC with an estimate of -0.096 (p < 0.010).  
However, SRPERSIST fell out of significance when the ECON variable was added.  Pairwise 
correlations indicated that SRPERSIST and ECON were negatively correlated at a value of  
-0.657 (p < 0.010).   
The control variables in Table 14 (column 2) showed that the CURVE variable, estimated 
at -2.090, dropped in significance (p < 0.050) when ECON was estimated with SRPERSIST in 
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the model.  Among the control variables for bond characteristics, only AMT remained significant 
and negatively associated with TIC at -0.157 (p < 0.010).   
[insert Table 14 here] 
4.6. Summary 
The moderating effect of economic activity on the association between SR magnitude and 
TIC was tested.  Main empirical analysis consisted of three hypothesis tests.  Among the 
hypotheses, H1 was supported.  H2 was not supported.  H3 was not supported but the results 
yielded a significant interaction between SR surpluses and economic activity that was counter to 
my prediction.  
Results from H1 and H3 showed that departures from SR equilibrium (i.e., its magnitude) 
were positively moderated by economic activity.  Fundamental to this finding was the positive 
interaction between SR magnitude and ECON.  This finding suggests that while departures from 
SR equilibrium are penalized on TIC, the severity of the penalty is not constant and depends on 
whether aggregate conditions in the economy are good or bad.  Specifically, when economic 
activity at the state level has a positive outlook, departures from SR equilibrium impose an 
additive (i.e., more severe) penalty on TIC. 
 The results for RQ1 and RQ2 did not provide sufficient evidence that the second moment 
of SR, its historic volatility, has information content that is associated with TIC.  This result led 
to a post hoc analysis with a smaller subsample to examine whether the persistence of SR might 
be significant to TIC.  Results were counter to expectations in that SR persistence was positively, 
vice negatively associated with TIC.  However, the strength of this association was significant 
and the loss of significance to key control variables (e.g., unassigned fund balance, federal funds 
rate) suggest that SR persistence may capture similar effects from these control variables.  
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5. Discussion 
This study examined whether the information content of spending rate had differential 
effects on borrowing cost when state economic activity was considered.  Spending rate is a 
modified accrual earnings measure computed as the difference between general fund revenues 
and general fund expenditures of a municipality.  A narrow stream of governmental accounting 
literature that started from Wallace (1981) provided evidence that accounting measures related to 
the general fund (i.e, the primary operating fund) have information content.  Since Wallace 
(1981), the literature has evolved and affirmed that the information content of spending rate is 
significantly associated to various responses in the municipal bond market (e.g., true interest 
cost, net interest cost, bond yield spreads).   
Apostolou et al. (2014) demonstrated a positive association between departures from SR 
equilibrium (i.e., a balanced point where general revenues equal general fund expenditures) and 
borrowing cost.  This positive association was significant irrespective of whether the departure 
from equilibrium was in the negative or positive direction.  Their study resolved previous and 
conflicting findings regarding the association between spending rate and borrowing cost.  
Importantly, Apostolou et al.’s (2014) findings suggest that the market evaluates how well the 
reporting entity is able to balance its fiscal resources.  Their findings imply that maintaining a 
spending rate at or near zero is one way to minimize borrowing cost.   
Minimizing borrowing cost remains an important issue (Aguilar, 2015).  Municipal bonds 
serve as a major source of financing for local governments to maintain critical infrastructure that 
can affect the quality of life of citizens (SEC, 2012; Aguilar, 2015).  The importance of this 
market has been evidenced in its significant growth to approximately $3.1 trillion (SEC, 2012; 
Aguilar, 2015).  Furthermore, today’s municipal bond market has been characterized by greater 
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regulatory oversight since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.  This has also led to 
greater scrutiny by the SEC to keep borrowing cost at a minimum (Ang and Green, 2011; 
Aguilar, 2015).  
However, the ability of local government officials to maintain a close balance of revenues 
and expenditures may depend on the economic conditions to which they are subjected.  Studies 
and reports surrounding the after-effects of the financial crisis that started in 2007 provided 
strong anecdotal evidence that maintaining a balance between revenues and expenditures (i.e., 
spending rate equilibrium) was difficult for many municipalities (Gross et al., 2012; Atwell et al., 
2013).  Most municipalities depended largely on property taxes as a major source of revenue and 
the collapse of the housing bubble led to widespread decline in property values.  Concurrently, 
the financial crisis also weakened the states’ abilities to provide aid to municipalities (Gross et al, 
2012; Atwell et al., 2013).   
In a recent study, Givoly et al. (2017) provided evidence that the role of accounting 
information in the debt market was conditioned on the macroeconomy.  In their study, they focus 
on earnings information in the corporate sector and associated responses in the U. S. bond 
market.  The authors’ findings suggest that accounting numbers have greater relevance when the 
macroeconomy worsens.  Accordingly, the unique challenges experienced by municipalities after 
the financial crisis, coupled with evidence provided by Givoly et al. (2017), motivated my 
empirical examination of whether the information content of spending rate is also dynamic to 
conditions of the local economy.    
To accomplish the main research objective, I substantially extended from Apostolou et al. 
(2014) by incorporating the state leading indexes to proxy for local economic activity.  The state 
leading indexes are compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia and provide a 
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composite and forward-looking measure of local economic condition based on multiple for 
inputs related to economic growth.  The role of the state was highlighted as playing a crucial role 
to the recovery of municipalities after the financial crisis (Atwell et al., 2013).  Thus, including 
an aggregate measure of state economies was particularly relevant to this study. 
A precursor for this study was to identify a baseline empirical model that could estimate 
true interest cost as a function of governmental accounting information.  Also, this model had to 
be adaptable to periods of economic instability, such as with the financial crisis that began in 
2007.  Much of the recent literature in government accounting employed the use of bond ratings, 
which are based on lagged information.  The empirical models specified by Apostolou et al. 
(2014) divested from those models featured in conventional governmental accounting literature 
and well-proxied the contemporaneous interest rate environment with the effective federal funds 
rate, a key monetary-policy determinant.  Specifically, Apostolou et al. (2014) estimated true 
interest cost as a function of spending rate magnitude, controlled on bond characteristics and 
yield curve attributes that proxied for the prevailing interest rates.  The control variables for yield 
curve attributes made their models conducive to estimating borrowing cost during periods of 
extreme economic instability, whereby prevailing interest rates were unconventionally 
influenced by the Federal Reserve Bank (Wu and Xia, 2016).   
A partial replication of Apostolou et al.’s (2014) study with additional observations from 
the financial crisis, recession, and recovery periods (late 2007 through 2014) verified the 
extendibility of Apostolou et al.’s (2014) findings.  Specifically, the association between 
departures from spending rate equilibrium and borrowing cost remained positively associated 
across stable and unstable economic periods.  Verification of this association allowed for the 
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testing of three hypotheses on whether economic activity moderated the association between 
spending rate magnitude and borrowing cost.  
The research method employed a sample of 1,970 general obligation bonds that were 
newly issued in the years 1995 through 2014.  Issuers consisted of 294 counties among 36 states.  
Reported governmental accounting information used to compute spending rate was sourced from 
county Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) that followed standards set forth by 
the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) in Statement No. 34.32  Hypothesis 
testing was conducted through a series of ordinary least squares regressions with the application 
of fixed effects. 
The first hypothesis predicted a significant interaction between spending rate magnitude 
and economic activity.  The rationale for this hypothesis was drawn from the idea that the 
information content of earnings was negatively associated to gross domestic product (Givoly et 
al., 2017); this association indicated that earnings has greater information content when 
economic conditions worsen.  Similarly, I extended on this rationale in the governmental setting 
to test whether spending rate magnitude had a significant interaction with economic activity.  A 
significant interaction would indicate that the association between spending rate magnitude and 
borrowing cost depends on the level of economic activity. 
 Results of the first hypothesis provided the main finding for this study.  I found a 
significant and positive interaction between spending rate magnitude and economic activity.  A 
clear interaction was evident.  Regression results revealed that the direct and positive effect of 
spending rate magnitude on true interest cost dissipated while the main effect of economic 
                                                          
32 CAFRs used for this study received a mark of excellence in financial reporting based on requirements 
established by the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), a professional association that is 
not affiliated with GASB.  
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activity remained negatively associated with true interest cost.  Essentially, the main effect of 
economic activity was adjusted by the positive interaction between spending rate magnitude and 
economic activity.  When economic activity was positive, the main effect of economic activity 
lowered borrowing cost but larger departures from spending rate equilibrium imposed a greater 
penalty on borrowing cost, as evidenced by the positive interaction.  In contrast, when economic 
activity was negative, the main effect of economy activity increased borrowing cost.  However, 
the interaction of negative economic activity and spending rate magnitude imposed a decrease on 
true interest cost, suggesting that larger departures from spending rate equilibrium were assessed 
less severely when the economic condition was unfavorable. 
At the onset, this main finding may seem counterintuitive.  In a study by Park et al., 
(2016), the authors similarly predicted increased salience in true interest cost during and after the 
financial crisis and found no support for greater penalty on true interest cost.  This prediction is 
understandable, given significant findings in previous research that focus on the debt market’s 
sensitivity to downside risk in earnings (e.g., Plummer and Tse, 1999; Easton et al., 2009).  
However, my main finding makes sense when one considers Apostolou et al.’s (2014) suggestion 
that the market evaluates managerial competence over fiscal resources, relative to the benchmark 
of spending rate equilibrium.   
Specifically, the positive interaction suggests that the ability of county officials to 
maintain spending rate equilibrium is assessed more severely when times are good in the 
economy.  Put another way, maintaining a balance between revenues and expenditures during 
stable economic conditions is expected and failure to achieve this balance is, in the aggregate, 
unexpected.  Thus, a larger departure from spending rate equilibrium during good economic 
times is contrary to the market’s general expectations and influences a higher penalty on 
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borrowing cost.  In contrast, when there is a poor economy, the market’s overall expectation of 
management’s ability to balance revenues and expenditures is generally lower.  Thus, the 
inability to maintain a balance between revenues and expenditures would not necessarily come 
as a surprise and thus, departures from spending rate equilibrium are imposed less severely 
during a poor economy.  
Apostolou et al. (2014) found that the association between true interest cost and spending 
rate magnitude was asymmetric for positive (i.e., surplus) and negative (i.e., deficit) departures 
from spending rate equilibrium.  Procedures from the first hypothesis test were repeated for 
hypotheses two and three.  Separate test variables for the magnitudes of spending rate surpluses 
and deficits, and their respective interactions with economic activity, were added to the baseline 
model.  Hypotheses two and three were jointly tested in one regression.  Hypothesis two 
predicted that negative departures from spending rate equilibrium would be assessed more 
heavily on true interest cost when economic conditions are bad (i.e., economic activity is low). 
Results for hypothesis two were not supported at a conventional level of significance.  
Spending rate magnitude for deficits were positively associated with borrowing cost and 
inclusion of its interaction with economic activity were suggestive of its relevance on borrowing 
cost.  But there was insufficient evidence to reject the null.  Two reasons might explain a null 
finding.  First, the size of the magnitude of the deficits were approximately twelve times smaller 
than the magnitude of the surpluses.33  A second reason might be due to the significance of the 
unassigned fund balance.  Apostolou (1982, 75) explained that a deficit in the general fund may 
be less important if the size of the fund balance is relatively large.   The overall average trend of 
unassigned fund balance levels steadily increased over the sample period while deficits remained 
                                                          
33 Average magnitude of deficits and surpluses were 0.008 and 0.094, respectively.  Computation used 
was 0.094/0.008 = 11.75. 
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fairly level.  Regressions results for hypothesis testing consistently indicated that conditioning on 
unassigned fund balance was significant to explaining borrowing cost.  Combined, the interactive 
effect of economic activity and negative departures from spending rate equilibrium may have 
been negligible.   
Hypothesis three predicted that positive departures from spending rate equilibrium would 
be associated with a discount on borrowing cost (i.e., a negative interaction term).  This 
hypothesis was not supported.  I obtained significant results for the interaction term that showed 
positive moderation.  These results were counter to my prediction of a discount on borrowing 
cost for positive departures from spending rate equilibrium.  This finding suggests that the 
market assesses the ability to balance revenues and expenditures, vice accumulate excess 
resources during times of economic instability.  This finding reinforces the market’s evaluation 
of managerial competence relative to a benchmark, which is consistent with Jiang (2008).   
I also explored whether spending rate volatility was relevant to explaining borrowing 
cost.  Significance in spending rate volatility would indicate that the second moment of spending 
rate has information content.  In research question one, I tested for significance in the coefficient 
for spending rate volatility.  Dichev and Tang (2009) explained that the historical volatility of 
earnings was related to economic factors when there is perfect matching between revenue and 
expenditures.  Given a focus on economic activity across the financial crisis and recovery 
periods, I examined if these periods of extreme economic instability were captured in the 
historical volatility of spending rate.  I estimated the historical volatility of spending rate by 
computing the coefficient of variation over the previous five years.34  Results of this test were 
inconclusive.  While regression results provided a significant coefficient for spending rate 
                                                          
34 Gore (2009) computed revenue volatility over four consecutive years using the coefficient of variation.  
I adopted the same approach to compute spending rate volatility over five years.   
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volatility, the value of the coefficient itself was indiscernible from zero.  Research question two 
was not testable given these results. 
Although spending rate is a modified accruals measure, it may possess some properties 
that are similar to corporate earnings.  Given inconclusive findings for spending rate volatility, I 
conducted a post hoc analysis to explore the significance of spending rate persistence and its 
association to borrowing cost.  Persistence is a proxy for earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010).  
The corporate literature provided evidence that the persistence of earnings is considered a 
positive attribute (Dechow et al., 2010).  Dichev and Tang (2009) provided a mathematical 
derivation of persistence that defined persistence as the inverse of volatility.  I rationalized that if 
the volatility of spending rate was not assimilated to borrowing cost, perhaps its persistence 
would be valued by the market.  If so, this should result in a negative association between 
spending rate persistence and borrowing cost.  Post hoc results indicated a strong and positive 
association between spending rate persistence and borrowing cost.  Interestingly, the control 
variables of unassigned fund balance and the federal funds rate fell out of significance when 
spending rate persistence was added to the model.  Also, when the variable for economic activity 
was included, spending rate persistence fell out of significance.  Also unexpected was the 
positive coefficient for persistence.  A possible explanation is that the model estimated the 
persistence of departures from spending rate equilibrium (a bad attribute), rather than what is 
understood in the corporate literature as the sustainability of future earnings (a good attribute).  If 
this were the case, then a positive association is plausible.  
5.1. Implications and suggestions for future research 
 As of date, no governmental accounting study has investigated the interactive effects of 
local economic activity and the information content spending rate.  I extended the governmental 
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accounting literature by providing preliminary evidence that the information content of spending 
rate is not constant and that information content is dynamic to the level of economic activity.  
Much of the recent governmental accounting literature focuses on the relevance of accrual based 
measures for government-wide reporting per GASB Statement No. 34 (e.g., Reck and Wilson, 
2014; Ragland, 2017).  The recent literature concluded that longer term accrual-based accounting 
measures provide incremental information only in the presence of modified accrual measures.  
The findings in this study suggest that the relevance of accrual-based measures may also depend 
on when the information content of spending rate is most relevant.  Future research might benefit 
by examining accrual-based measures conditioned on economic activity. 
 Continuing from the previous point, the main finding also highlights the importance of 
state economies on the fiscal performance of municipalities and other local governments.  This 
study has shown that the state leading indexes compiled by the Federal Reserve can serve as an 
important variable to proxy for local economic conditions.  Streib, Svara, Waugh, and Klase 
(2007) stressed the importance of factoring in the impact of the state for research that involves 
county samples.  The significance of the state leading indexes was consistent with this point.  
Thus far, no recent accounting literature has incorporated the state leading indexes compiled by 
the Federal Reserve.   Including composite measures of local economic conditions may provide 
incremental information for a wide variety of accounting research.   
 The finding of a positive moderation from the interaction between spending rate 
magnitude and economic activity is of particular importance.  As it pertains to responses in debt 
markets, the a priori expectation built upon the option framework is supported by strong 
evidence that responses in the debt markets are sensitive to downside risk in earnings.  Givoly et 
al. (2017) note, however, that the option framework does not capture other relevant information 
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that is available and/or disclosed to market participants.  The predictions in this study were 
largely grounded in the literature that applied to the option framework.  The overarching 
rationale was that spending rate represented an important measure of general fund performance 
and thus, the municipal bond market would also be sensitive to downside risk in spending rate.  
Specifically, given poor economic conditions from the financial crisis, I expected even larger 
departures from spending rate equilibrium.  Furthermore, I expected these departures to be 
associated with harsher penalty on borrowing cost.  However, the finding of a positive 
moderation is contrary to this expectation.  Instead, this finding implies that the market assesses 
greater penalty on management’s ability to balance revenues and expenditures when economic 
conditions are good.  When economic conditions are bad, the market adjusts its expectations 
regarding management’s ability to achieve balance.  Thus, departures from spending rate 
equilibrium are assessed less severely when there is a poor economy.35   
 Fundamentally, it is not the spending rate measure itself that is being evaluated by the 
market.  Rather, the market evaluates the managerial competence over spending rate, relative to a 
benchmark (i.e., spending rate equilibrium).  Apostolou et al. (2014) demonstrated that keeping 
spending rate at or near zero is one way of minimizing borrowing cost.  My findings are 
consistent with this notion and has practical implications for local managers to minimize 
borrowing cost.  Future research might explore the incentives surrounding the importance of this 
benchmark and other potential consequences.  This study suggests that maintaining the 
benchmark is beneficial for borrowing cost.  However, Felix (2015) found that municipal 
                                                          
35 Given the finding of a positive moderation between spending rate magnitude and economic activity, I 
explored additional literature related to economic condition and corporate earnings.  Two earnings-
management studies (Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman, 2002; Cohen and Zarowin, 2007) provided 
rationale that are consistent with my main finding.  Future development of this study will need to build 
upon findings from Conrad et al. (2002) and Cohen and Zarowin (2007). 
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managers excessively use inter-fund transfers to maintain a general fund balance near zero.  
Costello et al. (2017) also provided evidence of “earnings management” at the state level inter-
temporally, which contradicts GASB Concept Statement No. 1. Whether these collective actions 
are beneficial for the long-term, economic well-being of the municipality is uncertain. 
 Exploring spending rate based on its volatility and persistence yielded significant (post 
hoc) results that may warrant further investigation.  Little is known concerning the quality of 
spending rate and/or other similar performance measures in the governmental setting.  The 
modified accrual basis of accounting makes spending rate a unique measure.  Future studies 
might apply the earnings quality framework from corporate literature to investigate the extent to 
which spending rate mimics earnings behavior.  Also, Dechow et al. (2010) identified 
determinants of earnings quality (e.g., governance, auditors, financial reporting practices, entity-
level characteristics).  Examining how these determinants influence the quality of the spending 
rate may also be an avenue for future research. 
5.2. Limitations 
The interpretation of the findings is limited in two ways.  First, the sample selection was 
strictly based on primary county governments that corresponded directly to the CAFR data.  This 
decision was made to provide greater homogeneity in the sample.  However, this also reduced 
the generalizability of the results to primary county governments.  Also, as with many panel data, 
the sample was unbalanced and thus, further limits the findings to counties that make up most of 
the observations in the sample.   
A second limitation involves greater regulatory oversight stemming from the Dodd-Frank 
Act of 2010.  Given data limitations, I did not include control variable(s) to account for changes 
related to Dodd-Frank.  One result that came from this legislation was a requirement for dealers 
 70 
 
to register with the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) before engaging in 
municipal bond sales.36  Liu (2015) found that the familiarity between dealers (i.e., financial 
advisors) and issuers or underwriters, respectively, was associated with lower or higher 
borrowing cost for negotiated sales. Whether greater oversight affected the familiarity among 
these parties and/or other factors related to borrowing cost are yet to be fully understood. 
5.3. Conclusion 
 Since Wallace (1981), research has provided evidence that spending rate has information 
content to various responses in the municipal bond market.  Over the years, studies have 
produced mixed results on the association between spending rate and borrowing cost.  Apostolou 
et al. (2014) clarified that the association is relative to a balanced point where revenues equal 
expenditures.  Their finding implies that the market evaluates a municipality’s ability to achieve 
this balance.  In sum, spending rate is a proxy for managerial competence. 
 This study extended from Apostolou et al. (2014) and examined whether the information 
content of spending rate was influenced by the state’s economy.  My results provide preliminary 
evidence that the information content of spending rate is dynamic to levels of economic activity.  
Regression results clearly indicated that the association between spending rate magnitude and 
borrowing cost was positively moderated by economic activity.  This suggests that the municipal 
bond market assesses departures from spending rate equilibrium more severely when economic 
conditions are favorable and less severely when economic conditions are unfavorable.  On a 
practical basis, this finding suggests that achieving spending rate near zero may minimize 
borrowing cost.  Lastly, the notion that information content of spending rate is dynamic to 
                                                          
36 http://www.msrb.org/Regulated-Entities/MSRB-Registration.aspx 
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economic activity might provide incremental benefit regarding the usefulness of other 
governmental accounting measures under the current financial reporting model.  
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Appendix A – Tables 
Table 1 
Summary of primary literature. 
Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Spending 
rate 
Wallace  
(1981) 
Examine effects of auditing 
& accounting variables on 
bond ratings and borrowing 
cost, as measured by NIC 
n = 106 new GO & 
revenue utility bond 
issues in 1974-1976 
for FL counties, 
cities, schools 
 
- Significant associations between general fund 
performance variables with NIC, but not with 
bond ratings. 
- Negative coefficient between SR deficit and 
NIC suggests that SR deficit reduces 
borrowing cost. Wallace considers this 
finding counterintuitive and attributes this to 
the fund accounting process (i.e., modified 
accrual basis calls for earlier recognition of 
expenditures; thus, deficit condition may 
provide a positive signal that municipal 
managers have not distorted reporting). 
Spending 
rate 
Ingram & 
Copeland 
(1982) 
Part II of an extension of  
Wallace (1981) that 
examines how degree of 
rigor in accounting and 
auditing policies are 
associated to systematic risk 
and alternative measures of 
bond yield premiums 
n = 122 
municipalities that 
issued non-callable 
GO bonds in 
secondary market in 
1977 
  
- Results are consistent with Wallace (1981) 
with negative coefficient for changes in SR on 
dependent variable of systematic risk (beta). 
- Changes in SR calculated as the percentage 
change in total revenue less total expenditure 
(defined in Part I by Copeland & Ingram, 
1982); changes in SR not a volatility measure. 
- Degree of rigor in both accounting and 
auditing regulations from the state level are 
significant to beta and bond yield premiums.  
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Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Spending 
rate 
Wilson & 
Howard  
(1984) 
Replicate and extend on 
Wallace (1981) with 
methodological 
improvements and a larger 
sample of bond issues from 
municipalities across the 
nation 
n = 230 GO bonds 
issued in 1978-
1981  
 
- General fund performance variables are 
significantly associated with bond ratings; 
(Wallace (1981) only found significance with 
NIC). 
- Higher current surplus in the general fund is 
associated with lower NIC while general fund 
deficit is associated with higher NIC.  All 
results suggest a negative association between 
general fund performance and borrowing cost. 
Spending 
rate 
Apostolou et al. 
(1985) 
Examine the possibility that 
the association between SR 
and NIC changes slope at a 
balanced budget point 
n = 478 GO bonds 
issued by MN 
municipalities in 
1977-1980 
 
- The rate of surplus spending and rate of deficit 
spending are both positively associated to NIC; 
supports the change in slope. 
- Results provide initial evidence that relation 
between SR and NIC is non-monotonic, at a 
balanced-budget point. 
Spending 
rate 
Plummer et al. 
(2007) 
Examine whether accruals-
based measures from 
GASB’s 34 financial 
reporting model provide 
incremental information, 
relative to modified-
accruals based measures, for 
assessment of default risk, 
as proxied by debt ratings 
n = 530 TX school 
districts that issued 
information and 
GO bonds in 2002 
- The accruals-based “earnings” (revenues less 
expenditures) does not provide more 
incremental information on credit ratings than 
the modified-accruals based “earnings” (i.e., 
SR of the general fund) 
- Best information content to explain debt 
ratings is SR and total net assets (an accruals 
measure of total assets less total liabilities) 
- SR surplus is positively correlated with debt 
ratings, suggesting that credit ratings worsen as 
surpluses increase. 
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Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Spending 
rate 
Apostolou et al. 
(2014) 
Examine and validate mixed 
findings from prior studies 
on SR given the dramatic 
growth in municipal market 
and stronger SEC oversight  
n = 3,285 GO 
bonds issued by 
314 U. S. counties 
in 1995-2007 
- Association between SR magnitude and TIC 
follows a nonlinear, nonmonotonic, and 
asymmetric profile, around an equilibrium 
point where revenues equals expenditures 
(i.e., SR equilibrium).   
- Asymmetry suggests that negative SR 
(deficit) is more heavily penalized than 
positive SR (surplus). 
- Maintaining SR at or near SR equilibrium 
proxies for managerial competence to keep 
borrowing cost at a minimum. 
Spending 
rate 
Reck & Wilson 
(2014) 
Extend on Plummer et al. 
(2007) with a shorter- vs. 
longer- term focus for 
accruals vs. modified 
accruals based measures 
from GASB’s 34 financial 
reporting model.  
n = 185 GO bonds 
issued by 
municipalities from 
2002-2006 
- Government-wide longer-term accruals are 
incrementally useful in estimating TIC when 
combined with modified accruals measures. 
- General fund performance variables 
(measured as revenues less expenditures 
scaled by revenues) are negatively associated 
with TIC, suggesting that higher borrowing 
cost are associated as general fund 
performance declines. 
Corporate 
earnings 
Plummer & Tse 
(1999) 
Examine the conditions that 
influence the importance of 
earnings to shareholders vs. 
bondholders; predictions 
based on the liquidation 
option hypothesis 
n = 1,719 stocks, 
and n = 4,983 
corporate bonds 
issued in 1986-
1993  
- Earnings losses are more informative for bond 
holders than for shareholders as a company’s 
financial condition deteriorates, except for the 
most financially sound firms (i.e., 
bondholders are more sensitive to downside 
risk) 
- Controlling for firm financial strength is 
important 
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Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Corporate 
earnings 
Bharath et al. 
(2008) 
Examine how accounting 
quality of the firm 
influences the firm’s 
propensity to borrow from 
the bank or the bond market 
and how these decisions 
influence the cost of debt 
n = 3,681 corporate 
bonds, 12,676 bank 
loans issued by the 
same firms in 1988-
2003 
- Accounting quality, proxied by abnormal 
operating accruals, is significant to the source 
of financing and the cost of debt. 
- Firms with relatively lower accounting quality 
have higher propensity to pursue bank loans 
while firms with relatively higher accounting 
quality have higher propensity to pursue 
corporate bonds; cost of debt for corporate 
bonds is significantly lower. 
Corporate 
earnings 
Jiang  
(2008) 
Examine whether earnings 
benchmarks reduce a firm’s 
cost of debt; predictions 
based on prospect theory 
n = 8,878 debt 
ratings issued in 
1985-2002, and  
n = 1,798 yield-
spreads from 
corporate bonds 
issued in 1983-
2002 
- Among the three benchmarks (beat last year’s 
earnings, beat analysts forecast, beat zero 
earnings), the zero-earnings benchmark is 
most salient for cost of debt. 
Corporate 
earnings 
Easton et al. 
(2009) 
Examine the role of 
earnings in corporate bond 
market  
n = 10,237 bonds 
issued in 1994-
2006 
- Nonlinear payoff structure of bond securities 
affects the role of accounting earnings such 
that unexpected earnings, annual bond 
returns, and trade volume are greater for bad 
earnings news (i.e., losses). 
Corporate 
earnings 
Defond & Zhang  
(2014) 
Test predictions regarding 
the timing of stock market 
vs. bond market reactions to 
good vs bad news on 
earnings 
n = 11,641 
quarterly earnings 
announcements and 
n = 47,522 bond-
year observations 
1996-2006 
- Bond price quotes impound most bad 
earnings news information in the pre-
announcement period; suggest an overreaction 
by bond investors to bad earnings news. 
- Speculative grade bonds react more strongly 
to bad earnings news, relative to investment 
grade bonds. 
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Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Corporate 
earnings 
Givoly et al. 
(2017) 
Examine whether the 
relevance of accounting 
information has increased or 
decreased over time in the 
corporate debt market 
n = 13,910 bond 
series issued by 
2,754 firms from 
1975-2013  
- Information content in the corporate bond 
market has steadily increased, relative to the 
information content in the equity market.  
- Significant association of information content 
to economic and reporting variables; suggests 
that when GDP coefficient is negative, 
accounting information has more content (i.e., 
more relevance). 
Earnings 
volatility 
Graham et al. 
(2005) 
Examine factors that affect 
earnings and disclosure 
decisions among CFOs  
n = 401 CFOs of 
public and private 
companies in 2003 
(10.4% response 
rate for survey) and 
interviews of subset 
of n = 20 CFOs 
- CFOs prefer to avoid volatility and to provide 
smoothness in earnings information. 
- Interviews disclose importance of beating 
earnings.  
- Some survey evidence supports the notion 
that earnings-loss avoidance can lower cost of 
debt (found only among highly leveraged, 
unprofitable, and/or private firms) 
Earnings 
volatility 
Dichev & Tang  
(2008) 
Present and test a theory on 
the correlation between 
contemporaneous revenues 
and expenses based on the 
degree of matching  
n = 1,000 large  
U. S. firms from 
1967-2003 
- Given the assumption that revenues and 
expenses are perfectly matched, the volatility 
of earnings is positively associated with the 
volatility of economic shocks and the 
persistence of economic shocks. 
- Trend of matching has worsened over the 
sample period; authors suggest that continued 
emphasis of accounting standard setters 
towards fair value accounting will most likely 
continue to result in greater mismatch 
between revenues and expenses. 
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Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Earnings 
volatility 
Dichev & Tang  
(2009) 
Examine the association 
between earnings volatility 
and earnings persistence 
n = 22,113 firm-
years observations 
from 12/31 from 
1984-2004 
- Earnings volatility reduces earnings 
persistence; decreased persistence reduces 
predictability of earnings. 
- Inclusion of earnings volatility is significant 
to improving predications of short- and long- 
term earnings (out to 5 years). 
Earnings 
volatility 
Gore  
(2009) 
Examine the determinants 
of cash levels in municipal 
government 
n = 9,413 
municipalities 
financial data 
reported to the U. 
S. Census Bureau 
for 1997-2002 
- Revenue volatility (a determinant of SR) is 
significant to excess cash levels among 
municipalities; further, these excess cash 
levels are associated with evidence consistent 
with agency problems between municipal 
managers and citizens (e.g., greater 
managerial bonuses, administrative spending) 
Earnings 
volatility 
Felix  
(2015) 
Examine the use of inter-
fund transfers by 
municipalities to manage 
the general fund at or near 
zero 
n = 103 
municipalities with 
populations 
>25,000 for 
2001-2003 that  
- Evidence supports prediction that inter-fund 
transfers are used by municipalities to 
maintain the general fund at or near zero; 
evidence of this practice is most pronounced 
for municipalities that have greater external 
oversight; results are consistent with CFO 
preference for smoothness in earnings 
(Graham et al., 2005) 
Earnings 
volatility 
Erickson et al. 
(2017) 
Examine investor’s risk 
judgements to earnings 
volatility (volatile/smooth) 
and operating cash flow 
volatility (volatile/smooth) 
n = 121 business 
school alumni from 
a large U. S. 
university; 6.7% 
response rate for a  
2 × 2 between-
subjects design 
- Investors perceive risk when both operating 
cash flows and earnings are volatile 
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Topic Author(s)  
Year 
Purpose  Sample Key Findings 
Financial 
crisis 
Kothari & Lester  
(2012) 
Discuss the role of GAAP 
accounting surrounding the 
financial crisis of late 2007 
and offer lessons learned 
n/a - Fair value accounting was a major 
contributing factor to the onset of the 
financial crisis in late December 2007. 
- Loans repackaged by banks from inflated 
asset valuations, coupled by a prevalence of 
variable mortgages sold in the subprime 
mortgage market led to a drastic decline in the 
financial sector when the Federal Reserve 
raised interest rates in 2005. 
Financial 
crisis 
Gross et al. 
(2012) 
Examine trends in two 
major sources of revenue 
(property taxes and state 
aid), in the period following 
the Great Recession of 2008 
n = 30 cities from 
the largest 
metropolitan areas 
in the U. S., from 
2009 to 2011; data 
analyzed is from 
surveys used in 
other studies 
- Municipal revenues sources were profoundly 
affected; both state aid and property taxes 
declined such that it hindered local 
borrowing. 
- The process of tax assessments prolonged the 
effects of the financial crisis into the recovery 
period. 
Financial 
crisis 
Atwell et al. 
(2013) 
Examine the range of state 
intervention for 
municipalities in fiscal 
distress  
n = 50 U. S. states 
and a subsample of 
n = 7 states for 
comparative 
analyses 
- Stages of municipal difficulty are defined, 
based on practice: distress, crisis, bankruptcy. 
- A major incentive for state-level monitoring 
and intervention of municipalities is to avoid 
downgrades in state credit ratings. 
Financial 
crisis 
Park et al.  
(2017) 
Examine the association 
between internal control 
deficiencies and municipal 
borrowing cost 
n = 3,633 municipal 
bonds issued by 
CA, TX, WA in 
2005-2012  
- Internal control deficiencies from material 
weaknesses are significantly associated with 
municipal bond borrowing cost. 
- No significant difference in TIC is evident for 
the financial crisis period. 
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Table 2 
Variable descriptions. 
Variable Name Definition 
True interest cost TIC interest expense incurred by county (i) issuer 
of municipal bonds; reported as a percentage 
Spending rate 
 
SR 
 
total revenues minus total expenditures  
scaled by population 
Spending rate magnitude SR1 absolute value of SR 
Spending rate magnitude (surplus) SRS equal to the absolute value of SR if SR is in a 
surplus condition (i.e., SR > 0) 
Spending rate magnitude (deficit) SRD equal to the absolute value of SR if SR is in a 
deficit condition (i.e., SR < 0) 
Spending rate volatility SRVOL coefficient of variation of SR over the 
previous five years 
State leading index ECON 
 
the leading index for the State (j) of county(i) 
for the same month in which the bond was 
issued 
Unassigned fund balance FB unassigned fund balance scaled by population 
Yield curve slope SLOPE average maturity of the bond issue in years 
Yield curve curvature CURVE the inverse of the average maturity of the 
bond issue in years (i.e., 1/SLOPE) 
Yield curve level LEVEL 
 
the combination of the effective federal funds 
rate (1995-2008) and the shadow federal 
funds rate (2009-2014), for the same month 
in which the bond was issued  
Bond issue amount AMT natural log of the average maturity of the 
bond issue scaled by population 
Pricing mechanism 
 
BID 
 
a binary variable assigned the value of 1 if 
issue was competitively bid; 0 if negotiated 
Bond rating 
 
BR 
 
a binary variable assigned the value of 1 if the 
issue carries the ‘Aaa’ Moody’s rating; else 0  
Call feature 
 
CALL 
 
a binary variable assigned the value of 1 if the 
bond issue is callable; else 0 
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Table 3  
Summary of expectations for tests. 
Hypotheses Variables tested Expectations 
H1: The association between spending  
rate magnitude and borrowing cost is 
moderated by economic activity. 
SR1×ECON β is statistically significant 
 
H2: Negative departures from SR equilibrium 
(SR deficits) are assessed more severely 
on TIC as economic activity declines. 
SRD×ECON  β > 0 
H3: Positive departures from SR equilibrium 
(SR surpluses) are assessed less severely 
on TIC as economic activity declines. 
SRS×ECON β < 0 
RQ1: Is TIC associated with SR volatility?   SRVOL β is statistically significant 
RQ2: Is the association between TIC and SR 
volatility moderated by economic  
activity?   
SRVOL×ECON β is statistically significant 
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Table 4 
Summary of sample selection. 
Steps in data preparation Sample size 
New GO bond issued by primary county governments (1995–2014) 17,001 
Less observations without values for TIC (12,638) 
Less duplicates, missing values, incorrect entries for cities (15) 
Less observations after merge with reported accounting data  (2,377) 
Less removal of an unverifiable outlier for TIC (1) 
Total                                                                                                              n = 1,970 
Data are from four sources: Thomson Reuter’s SDC Platinum for GO bonds, GFOA’s financial 
indicators database for CAFR data, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s database for state 
leading indexes, and the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for federal funds rate data.  
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Table 5 
Sample distribution by state. 
State State 
Abbr. 
Number of  
county issuers 
Number of new  
GO bond issues 
Percentage of 
the sample (%) 
Maryland MD 14 224 11.37 
Wisconsin WI 15 195 9.90 
North Carolina NC 44 178 9.04 
Michigan MI 22 155 7.87 
Minnesota MN 13 128 6.50 
Texas TX 26 111 5.63 
South Carolina SC 17 106 5.38 
Virginia VA 13 105 5.33 
Washington WA 9 99 5.03 
Tennessee TN 7 85 4.31 
Nevada NV 2 78 3.96 
New York NY 6 77 3.91 
Florida FL 16 55 2.79 
Iowa IA 5 53 2.69 
Kansas KS 3 49 2.49 
California CA 17 46 2.34 
Illinois IL 7 41 2.08 
Ohio OH 11 41 2.08 
Oregon OR 9 36 1.83 
Utah UT 3 19 0.96 
Georgia GA 5 16 0.81 
Pennsylvania PA 5 13 0.66 
Louisiana LA 4 11 0.56 
Colorado CO 3 6 0.30 
Missouri MO 2 6 0.30 
Kentucky KY 1 5 0.25 
Montana MT 2 5 0.25 
New Mexico NM 2 5 0.25 
Delaware DE 2 4 0.20 
Hawaii HI 2 4 0.20 
Arizona AZ 2 3 0.15 
Idaho ID 1 3 0.15 
Maine ME 1 3 0.15 
Oklahoma OK 1 3 0.15 
Indiana IN 1 1 0.05 
North Dakota ND 1 1 0.05 
Totals 36 294 1,970 100.00% 
This table is sorted by the number of GO bond issues (in descending order).   
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Table 6 
Sample distribution by year. 
Year Number of new  
GO bond issues 
Percentage of the 
sample (%) 
1995 34 1.73 
1996 73 3.71 
1997 61 3.10 
1998 86 4.37 
1999 63 3.20 
2000 66 3.35 
2001 98 4.97 
2002 95 4.82 
2003 107 5.43 
2004 117 5.94 
2005 107 5.43 
2006 105 5.33 
2007 102 5.18 
2008 99 5.03 
2009 156 7.92 
2010 169 8.58 
2011 103 5.23 
2012 118 5.99 
2013 116 5.89 
2014 95 4.82 
Totals 1,970 100.00% 
Representing GO bond issues from 294 counties among 
36 states.  
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Table 7 
Sample distribution by economic period. 
Economic period Relevant dates 
(inclusive)a 
Number of new 
GO bond issues 
Percentage of the 
sample (%) 
Size  
(amt in $mil) 
Pre-financial crisis Jan 1995 - Nov 2007 1,098 55.74 39,598 
Financial crisis Dec 2007 - Jun 2009 176 8.93 7,156 
Recovery Jul 2009 - Jun 2014 696 35.33 26,541 
Totals  1,970 100.00 73,295 
aSource: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
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Table 8 
Descriptive statistics. 
Panel A: continuous     
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TIC 3.640 1.220 0.120 7.160 
SR (no magnitude) 0.087 0.204 -0.425 1.394 
SR1 0.102 0.196 0.000 1.394 
SRS 0.094 0.197 0.000 1.394 
SRD 0.008 0.033 0.000 0.425 
SRVOL 0.237 4.455 -44.331 31.340 
ECON 0.978 1.515 -8.204 5.233 
Control variables:     
FB 0.086 0.085 -0.177 0.793 
SLOPE 15.574 7.148 0.364 99.000 
CURVE 0.120 0.222 0.010 2.747 
LEVEL 1.901 2.885 -2.986 7.070 
AMT -9.984 1.254 -16.236 -6.973 
AMT (face value)a  37.205 61.532 0.280 850.000 
Panel B: categoricalb      
Variables Frequency Relative Frequency (%)   
BID 1,865 94.6%   
BR  1,707 86.7%   
CALL 1,449 73.6%   
a Reported in $millions.  
b Compiled for bond characteristics that are coded 1 out of the full sample (n = 1,970): 
BID is coded 1 if competitively bid.  BR is coded 1 for Moody’s ‘Aaa’ long-term rating.  
CALL is coded 1 if the bond is callable.  
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Table 9 
Pearson (r) correlation values. 
Variables TIC SR SR1 SRS SRD SRVOL ECON FB SLOPE CURVE LEVEL AMT BID BR2 CALL 
TIC 1.000               
SR 0.189* 1.000              
SR1 0.183* 0.945* 1.000             
SRS 0.189* 0.987* 0.986* 1.000            
SRD -0.038 -0.270* 0.060* -0.110* 1.000           
SRVOL 0.068* 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.002 1.000          
ECON -0.065* 0.030 0.039 0.035 0.023 -0.056* 1.000         
FB -0.175* 0.147* 0.171* 0.161* 0.056* 0.024 -0.025 1.000        
SLOPE 0.515* 0.164* 0.169* 0.169* -0.003 0.051 -0.029 0.029 1.000       
CURVE -0.340* -0.089* -0.085* -0.088* 0.024 -0.014 0.059* -0.058* -0.544* 1.000      
LEVEL 0.671* 0.216* 0.209* 0.216* -0.046* 0.003 0.111* -0.157* 0.099* -0.006 1.000     
AMT -0.020 0.236* 0.266* 0.254* 0.063* 0.092* -0.023 0.315* 0.197* -0.034 -0.034 1.000    
BID 0.028 0.052* 0.045* 0.049* -0.028 -0.013 -0.040 0.081* 0.102* -0.232* -0.025 0.021 1.000   
BR 0.125* 0.085* 0.091* 0.089* 0.010 0.006 0.000 0.083* 0.235* -0.458* -0.003 0.081* 0.186* 1.000  
CALL 0.419* 0.117* 0.119* 0.119* -0.006 0.032 -0.010 0.032 0.664* -0.439* 0.076* 0.148* 0.140* 0.188* 1.000 
* indicates significance at the p < 0.050 level. Values are in bold if they are significant at p < 0.050 level and have a Pearson’s correlation 
value (r) that is greater than the absolute value of 0.50 (i.e., |0.50|).  
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Table 10 
Regression results for H1 (sample period 1995-2014). 
 
Dependent variable (TIC) 
 
Variable 
        (1)  
No interactiona 
     (2)  
Interactiona 
SR magnitude  SR1   0.248*** 
(3.26) 
0.054 
(0.48) 
 
State leading index ECON -0.052*** 
(-3.79) 
-0.065*** 
(-4.46) 
 
Interaction of SR magnitude 
and state leading index 
SR1×ECON n/a 0.155*** 
(3.05) 
 
Control variables: 
   
Unassigned fund balance FB -0.905*** -0.872*** 
Yield curve attributes SLOPE  0.054*** 0.055*** 
      CURVE -0.547** -0.544** 
 LEVEL   0.268*** 0.267*** 
Bond characteristics AMT -0.051*** -0.052*** 
 BID -0.153* -0.152* 
 BR -0.059 -0.056 
 CALL  0.377*** 0.373*** 
State-level FE  included included 
 N (bonds) 1,970 1,970 
 F-statisticb 443.479 489.690 
 Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 R2 (within) 0.7174 0.7183 
*, **, *** indicate significance at p<0.100, p<0.050, p<0.010 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
a t-statistics for independent variables are in parentheses using robust standard errors by state.  
b Degrees of freedom are (10,35) in column 1 and (11,35) in column 2.  
This table reports regression results for H1, which tested for a significant interaction between 
spending rate magnitude (SR1) and the state leading index (ECON); no direction is predicted for 
the interaction.  Column 1 shows significance for SR1 at 0.248 (p < 0.010) and (ECON) at  
-0.052 (p < 0.010), prior to interaction.  Column 2 shows a positive interaction between SR1 and 
ECON at 0.155 (p < 0.010).   
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Table 11   
Regression results for H2 and H3 (sample period 1995-2014). 
 
Dependent variable (TIC) 
 
Variable 
(1)   
No interactionsa 
(2) 
Interactionsa 
SR magnitude (surplus) SRS 0.247*** 
(2.96) 
 
0.042 
(0.35)   
SR magnitude (deficit) SRD 0.888*** 
(2.86) 
-0.537 
(-0.63) 
 
State leading index ECON -0.052*** 
(-3.80) 
-0.069*** 
(-4.80) 
Interaction of SR surplus and 
state leading index 
SRS×ECON n/a 0.153*** 
(3.11) 
 
Interaction of SR deficit and 
state leading index 
SRD×ECON n/a 0.968* 
(1.69) 
 
Control variables: 
   
Unassigned fund balance FB -0.921*** -0.915*** 
Yield curve attributes SLOPE  0.055***  0.055***   
      CURVE -0.547** -0.541**   
 LEVEL   0.268***  0.267***   
Bond characteristics AMT -0.051*** -0.052***   
 BID -0.149*   -0.154* 
 BR -0.059 -0.058    
 CALL  0.377***    0.374***   
State-level FE  included included 
 N (bonds) 1,970 1,970 
 F-statisticb 622.080   1451.041 
 Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 R2 (within) 0.7177 0.7189   
*, **, *** indicate significance at p<0.100, p<0.050, p<0.010 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
a t-statistics for independent variables are in parentheses using robust standard errors by state.  
b Degrees of freedom are (11, 35) in column 1 and (13, 35) in column 2.  
This table reports regression results for H2 and H3.  H2 tested for a significant interaction 
between the magnitude for spending rate deficit (SRD) and ECON.  H3 tested for a significant 
interaction between the magnitude for spending rate surplus (SRS) and ECON.  Column 1 shows 
significance for SRD at 0.888 (p < 0.010) and SRS at 0.247 (p < 0.010), prior to interaction with 
the state leading index.  Column 1 also shows significance for the state leading index (ECON) at 
-0.052 (p < 0.010).  In column 2, a positive interaction between SRS and ECON is estimated at 
0.153 (p < 0.010).  The interaction between SRD and ECON is estimated at 0.968 (p < 0.100), 
but does not reach a conventional level of significance.   
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Table 12   
Adjusted predictions of TIC on SR for select positive and negative ECON values  
Departure from SR equilibrium 
(SRS observations only)  
 
ECON >0 
 
Predicted TIC 
 
ECON <0 
 
Predicted TIC 
µ   =  0.094 +2.0 3.570 -2.0 3.845 
1σ =  0.291  3.578  3.853 
2σ =  0.488  3.586  3.862 
3σ =  0.685  3.595  3.870 
µ   =  0.094 +1.5 3.605 -1.5 3.811 
1σ =  0.291  3.613  3.819 
2σ =  0.488  3.621  3.827 
3σ =  0.685  3.629  3.835 
µ   =  0.094 +1.0 3.639 -1.0 3.775 
1σ =  0.291  3.647  3.785 
2σ =  0.488  3.655  3.793 
3σ =  0.685  3.664  3.801 
µ   =  0.094 +0.5 3.673 -0.5 3.742 
1σ =  0.291  3.681  3.750 
2σ =  0.488  3.690  3.758 
3σ =  0.685  3.698  3.767 
This table reports new linear predictions for TIC based on coefficients estimated for model 2, 
(i.e., test of the bifurcated sample).  Given significance in the SRS×ECON term (H3), TIC is 
estimated at four points that are equivalent to departures from SR equilibrium: the mean (μ) of 
the SRS observations is closest to SR equilibrium (SR=0) and each standard deviation marks a 
larger departure from SR equilibrium.  ECON levels chosen are in increments of 0.5, between 
values of -2.0 (poor economic outlook) to +2.0 (good economic outlook). 
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Table 13  
Regression results for RQ1 (sample period 1997-2014). 
 
Dependent variable (TIC) 
 
Variable 
     (1) 
No ECONa 
    (2) 
ECONa 
SR volatility SRVOL 0.009** 
(1.96) 
 
0.008 
(1.53) 
State leading index ECON n/a -0.075*** 
(-4.18) 
 
Control variables: 
   
Unassigned fund balance FB -0.942*** -0.899*** 
Yield curve attributes SLOPE 0.065*** 0.065*** 
      CURVE -0.759*** -0.725*** 
 LEVEL  0.251*** 0.244*** 
Bond characteristics AMT -0.070*** -0.068*** 
 BID -0.098 -0.100 
 BR -0.012 0.016   
 CALL 0.302*** 0.315*** 
Within cluster on counties  included included 
 N (bonds) 1,316 1,316 
 F-statistica 255.12 255.17 
 Model p-value 0.0000 0.0000 
 R2 (within) 0.7102 0.6193 
*, **, *** indicate significance at p<0.100, p<0.050, p<0.010 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
a t-statistics for independent variables are in parentheses using robust standard errors by county.  
b Degrees of freedom are (9, 118) in column 1 and (10, 118) in column 2. 
This table reports regression results for RQ1, which tests for significance in spending rate 
volatility (SRVOL). SRVOL is computed as the coefficient of variation of spending rate over 
five previous years.  Column 1 shows significance in spending rate volatility (SRVOL) at 0.009 
(p < 0.050); however, the value of the SRVOL coefficient is indiscernible from zero.  Column 2 
shows significance for the state leading index (ECON) at -0.075 (p < 0.010); SRVOL is 
nonsignificant upon inclusion of ECON.  
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Table 14   
Regression results for test of SR persistence (post hoc analysis for sample period 2005-2012) 
 
Dependent variable (TIC) 
 
Variable 
     (1) 
No ECONa 
   (2) 
ECONa 
SR persistence SRPERSIST 2.252*** 
(2.89) 
 
0.636 
(0.60) 
State leading index ECON n/a -0.096*** 
(-2.17) 
 
Control variables: 
   
Unassigned fund balance FB 0.080 0.170 
Yield curve attributes SLOPE 0.056*** 0.053*** 
      CURVE -2.371*** -2.090* 
 LEVEL  -0.098 -0.015 
Bond characteristics AMT -0.152*** -0.157*** 
 BID -0.131 -0.161 
 BR 0.231 0.280 
 CALL -0.011 0.080 
Within cluster on counties  included included 
 N (bonds) 100 100 
 F-statisticb 13.97 14.19 
 Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 
 R2 (overall) 0.4956 0.5183 
*, **, *** indicate significance at p<0.100, p<0.050, p<0.010 levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
a t-statistics for independent variables are in parentheses using robust standard errors by county.  
b Degrees of freedom are (9, 49) in column 1 and (10, 49) in column 2. 
This table reports regression results for post hoc analysis for spending rate persistence 
(SRPERSIST). SRPERSIST is the R-squared from the autoregressive regression estimation of 
SR lagged no more than three previous years. Column 1 shows significance in spending rate 
volatility (SRPERSIST) at 2.252 (p < 0.010). Column 2 shows significance for the state leading 
index (ECON) at -0.075 (p < 0.010); SRPERSIST is nonsignificant upon inclusion of ECON. 
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Appendix B – Figures 
Figure 1   
Average TIC, SR, ECON, and LEVEL values from 1995-2014 (inclusive)     
This figure presents cross-sectional means for the dependent variable (TIC), independent 
variables (SR and ECON), and a yield curve attribute, the federal funds rate control variable 
(LEVEL). TIC shows an overall decline across the sample period.  Relative to ECON, SR is 
fairly stable across the sample period. ECON shows dips below zero during recession years 
(early 2001 and the tech bubble; late 2007 financial crisis and subsequent recession).  The overall 
average trend ECON shows that it does not necessarily move in sequence with LEVEL.                                                            
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Figure 2  
Average SR, SR surpluses, and SR deficits from 1995-2014 (inclusive). 
This figure presents cross-sectional means for spending rate surplus and spending rate deficit 
(not magnitudes).  The largest levels of deficits and surpluses coincide with years of growth in 
economic history. A sharp decline is evident in surpluses starting in 2002. 
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Figure 3  
Average SR deficits and unassigned fund balances from 1995-2014 (inclusive). 
This figure presents the cross-sectional means of the magnitude of spending rate deficit (SRD) 
and unassigned fund balance (FB). A comparison of SRD, relative to the size of FB, shows an 
overall increase in FB levels while SRD remained stable across the sample period. A larger FB 
relative to SRD can better enable a municipality to compensate for deficits (Apostolou, 1982).  
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Figure 4  
Average SR and corresponding revenues and expenditures from 1995-2014 (inclusive)  
This figure presents the cross-sectional means of spending rate (SR) and its corresponding 
determinants of general fund revenues (GFREV) and general fund expenditures (GFEXP). 
Despite variation in GFREV and GFEXP, SR appears fairly stable across the sample. A 
noticeable dip appears for GFREV and GFEXP starting in 2009 to approximately 2012. This dip 
in GFREV and GFEXP are consistent with a prolonged recovery due to declines in revenues 
after the financial crisis Gross et al. (2012). 
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Appendix C – Overview of GASB Statement No. 34 
The governmental financial reporting model is summarized in GASB’s Statement No. 34.  
Financial reporting per Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) is accomplished 
through a governmental entity’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR).  The CAFR 
is comprised of a set of financial statements that are prepared in two ways: (1) government-wide 
financial statements are prepared using the full accrual basis of accounting and an “economic 
resources” measurement focus, and (2) fund-based financial statements for governmental funds 
are prepared using the modified accrual basis of accounting and a “current financial resources” 
measurement focus (GASB 1999; Plummer et al., 2007).37  Government-wide reporting provides 
a better picture of economic position while fund-based reporting provides a better picture of 
performance and fiscal accountability over current resources (Plummer et al., 2007).   
The “general fund” is the main operating fund of a municipality.  As a major 
governmental fund, the recognition of revenues and expenditures is reported under the modified 
accrual basis of accounting, which combines aspects of both the cash basis and the full accrual 
basis of accounting.  Per the modified accrual basis of accounting, general fund revenues should 
be deferred until they are “measurable and available,” while general fund expenditures are 
recorded when “claims against current financial resources take place, regardless of when cash is 
paid” (GASB, 1990).   
The revenue component of SR is largely comprised of revenues that result from non-
exchange transactions (Reck and Wilson, 2014).  Non-exchange transactions occur when a 
government “…gives (or receives) value from another party without directly receiving (or 
giving) equal value in return” (GASB, 1998).  Examples of non-exchange revenues are 
                                                          
37Proprietary and fiduciary fund financial statements are prepared under the full accrual basis of 
accounting with an economic resources measurement focus. 
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intergovernmental grants, entitlements, and property, sales, and personal and corporate income 
taxes (GASB, 1998).  The expenditure component of SR generally consists of current operating 
expenditures that should be classified, at a minimum, by function.  Any debt service or small 
capital expenditures that are charged to the general fund are usually presented separately from 
current operating expenditures.  
 The difference between general fund revenues and expenditures (i.e., SR) are reported as 
either a surplus or deficit on the Statement of Revenues, Expenditures, and Changes in Fund 
Balance (GASB 34).38  Accordingly, SR can be thought of as a modified-accruals measure of 
“earnings” in the general fund (Plummer et al., 2007).  Importantly, SR should not be confused 
with the term “fund balance.”   The “fund balance” represents the net of assets minus fund 
liabilities and is reported on the Balance Sheet for governmental funds.39  Any surplus or deficit 
from the management of revenues over expenditures during the accounting period will increase 
or decrease, respectively, the general fund balance from the prior accounting period. Thus, the 
general fund’s fund balance is an accumulation of surpluses or deficits from each accounting 
period.  Reck and Wilson (2014) highlight the significance of the unreserved (or unassigned) 
portion of an entity’s fund balance as a key indicator in assessing default risk.  The GFOA 
recommends that governments maintain a fund balance of “…no less than two months of general 
fund operating revenues or regular general fund operating expenditures.”40  
Unlike the private sector, GASB Statement No. 54 requires governmental entities that 
follow GAAP to further classify fund balance by imposed spending constraints.  Five levels of 
                                                          
38 “SR” or “spending rate” (revenues/expenditures) is not a term that is used on CAFRs.  Rather, SR is 
represented as a surplus (excess) or deficit (deficiency) of revenues over expenditures.  
39 For government-wide reporting (full accrual basis), the financial statements are called the Statement of 
Net Position (financial position) and the Statement of Activities (operating performance). 
40 GFOA’s “Best Practice” resource, titled Appropriate Level of Unrestricted Fund Balance in the 
General Fund at http://www.gfoa.org/appropriate-level-unrestricted-fund-balance-general-fund 
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spending constraints are identified in GASB Statement No. 54, with “non-spendable” denoting 
the most constrained portion of fund balance.  Per Reck & Wilson (2014), the unassigned fund 
balance that is prevalently used as a control variable in governmental accounting and public 
finance research is the unassigned fund balance.  Table C.1. summarizes the basic differences 
between spending rate and fund balance. 
Table C.1.  
Spending rate versus fund balance. 
Characteristics Spending rate Fund balance 
 
Name of the fund 
financial statement  
 
Statement of revenues, expenditures, and  
changes in fund balances 
 
Balance sheet for  
governmental funds 
 
Core equation and 
presentation 
 
 
Revenues – expenditures = surplus 
(deficit)  
  
 
Assets – liabilities = 
fund balance 
 
Time period Covers general fund performance over 
 the accounting period 
(usually over a fiscal year) 
 
Provides general fund 
position at a point in 
time (usually at fiscal-
year end) 
 
Basis of accounting 
and measurement 
Modified accrual basis and 
current financial resources 
 
Modified accrual basis 
and current financial 
resources 
 
Articulation between  
financial statements 
Surpluses increase prior fund balance 
Deficits decrease prior fund balance 
Fund balance represents 
an accumulation of 
surpluses or deficits 
from prior periods 
 
Constraints on 
spending 
Conditional on a governmental entity’s 
adopted budget and/or any revenue and 
expenditure policies 
GASB Statement No.54 
requires classification of 
the available fund 
balance by the spending 
constraints that are 
imposed: nonspendable, 
restricted, committed, 
assigned, unassigned 
fund balance 
 
 
